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Einladung: FöP am 4. Juni 2025 / Invitation: FöP on June 4, 2025

by vdsphilo20

Liebe alle, wir laden herzlich zur nächsten Fakultätsöffentlichen Präsentation von Dissertationsprojekten der Philosophie (FöP) ein. Am Mittwoch, den 4. Juni 2025 präsentieren drei Kandidat*innen ihre Dissertationsvorhaben im Hörsaal 2G (NIG, 2. Stock). Im Anschluss an die Präsentationen laden wir zu einem Austausch bei Sekt und Sushi ein. Programm: 13:15 Uhr Boda Liu, BA MA Das Leib-Ich: Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie Betreuung: Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz. 13:45 Uhr Eric Archambault, MA Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics Betreuung: Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer 14:15 Uhr Peter Schneider, BA MA Morbide Faszination. Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil Betreuung: Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz. Wir freuen uns sehr auf Ihre Teilnahme! Die Einladung kann gerne mit interessierten Personen geteilt werden. Mit herzlichen Grüßen Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz Studienprogrammleitung Doktoratsstudium Philosophie (SPL 43) *** Dear all, We warmly invite you to the next Public Faculty Presentation of Dissertation Projects in Philosophy (FöP). On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 1:15 p.m. in Lecture Hall 2G (NIG, 2nd floor), three candidates will present their dissertation projects. Following the presentations, we once again invite you to join us for a reception with sparkling wine and sushi. Programme: 1:15 p.m. Boda Liu, BA MA Das Leib-Ich: Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie Supervisor: Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz. 1:45 p.m. Eric Archambault, MA Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer 2:15 p.m. Peter Schneider, BA MA Morbide Faszination. Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil Supervisor: Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz. We are very much looking forward to your participation! Feel free to share this invitation with anyone who might be interested. With best wishes, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz Director of the Doctoral Program in Philosophy (SPL 43)

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Invitation: APSE talk by Matteo Vagelli on "Styles of Reasoning" & reading circle

by Miguel de la Riva

Dear all, we warmly invite you to the next APSE (Applied Philosophy of Science and Epistemology) Talk and Reading Circle. The talk will be held by Matteo Vagelli (Ca' Foscari University of Venice). Everybody is welcome. 1. TALK: When: Thursday, 05.06.2025, 15:00 - 17:00 Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien) Title: Understanding Scientific Knowledge in Terms of Styles of Reasoning Abstract: In this talk, I develop a more precise epistemological account of styles of reasoning (e.g. Crombie 1992; Davidson 2001; Elwick 2007; Hacking 1982, 1992, 2012; Kwa 2011; Radick 2000). I begin by situating the notion in relation to general logical modes of inference—deduction, induction, and abduction— highlighting its distinctive role in shaping scientific rationality. I then try to advance styles of reasoning as potential candidates to come to terms with scientific progress, understood both in relation to justification (Stegenga 2026) and understanding (Déllsen 2016), as well as with scientific pluralism, especially under its “interactive” account (Chang 2024). Next, I refine the distinction between two levels of styles: Level 1, large- scale styles of scientific reasoning (e.g. postulation, experimentation, modelling, taxonomy, statistics, historical development), and Level 2, small- scale inferential strategies operative within specific scientific practices (Bueno 2012). I argue that meaningful philosophical analysis of science requires attention to both levels and propose the addition of a local level—a more context-sensitive scale that captures the dynamic interaction between the two. To substantiate this claim, I examine contemporary research on Alzheimer’s disease (Bemelmans et al. 2016; Hardy & Higgins 1992; Schermer, 2023), illustrating how local configurations of reasoning styles mediate between broader methodological commitments and specific inferential moves. This case is particularly relevant, as it highlights the interplay between epistemic and non-epistemic factors in shaping scientific inquiry. By tracing how styles of reasoning operate across different levels within this research domain, the case study anchors the theoretical reflections and demonstrates how styles serve as a bridge between the logical and the social dimensions of scientific practice. By integrating conceptual refinement with empirical analysis, the talk aims to strengthen the epistemological foundations of the styles of reasoning framework and enhance its relevance for current debates on plurality, understanding, and the dynamics of scientific change. In doing so, it also seeks to render the framework more responsive to at least some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it (e.g. Kusch 2010; Rouse 2011). 2. READING CIRCLE: When: Thursday, 05.06.2025, 13:15 - 14:45 Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien) We will focus on an article by Matteo Vagelli (attached as PDF): Vagelli, Matteo (2024). Styles of Science and the Pluralist Turn: Between Inclusion and Exclusion. Revue de Synthèse 145 (3-4): 325-363. https:// doi.org/10.1163/19552343-14234053 For further reading regarding the topic: Bueno, Otavio. (2012). “Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43: 657-665. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.shpsa.2012.07.008 Daston, L. and Otte, M. (1991) “Introduction”, Science in Context, 4 (2): 223– 232. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700000946 Vagelli, M. (2024). “Hacking’s Styles of Scientific Reasoning.” In: Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. French and Anglophone Styles in History and Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_8 Vagelli, M. (2024). “Styles of Science, Styles of Philosophy.” In: Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. French and Anglophone Styles in History and Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_9 Wessely, A. (1991) “Transposing ‘Style’ from the History of Art to the History of Science”, Science in Context, 4 (2): 265–278. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S026988970000096X With best wishes, Miguel de la Riva -- https://bsky.app/profile/m-de-la-riva.bsky.social

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[Logik Café]: Robert C. May (UC Davis): "Value-Ranges", 02.06.2025, 16:30-18:00

by Georg Schiemer

Dear all, This is a reminder for today's talk in the Logik Café colloquium: Monday, 02.06.2025, 16:30-18:00, Robert C. May (UC Davis) <https://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/people/robert-may>: "Value-Ranges" Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie <https://philosophie.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/i_philosophie/Orient…> The meeting will be held form 16:30-18:00 in seminar room (3B (B0315) <https://philosophie.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/i_philosophie/Orient…>; 3rd floor) at the Department of Philosophy, Universitätsstrasse 7. Best wishes, Esther Heinrich Georg Schiemer

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Workshop "Praiseworthiness" Zoe Johnson King

by Sebastian Aster

Dear all, We are happy to invite you to a workshop with Zoe A. Johnson King (Harvard University) on “Praiseworthiness” taking place on June 11th, from 9:45 to 16:00 at Sensengasse 8/10. Zoe Johnson King is a leading figure in the philosophical debate on (moral) praise and praiseworthiness. The existing literature in moral responsibility and attached fields is primarily concerned with (moral) blame and blameworthiness which is why Zoe Johnson King has dedicated her upcoming book to the topic of praiseworthiness. The full book manuscript can be downloaded on her personal website: https://www.zoejohnsonking.com/research We are going to discuss the book together with Zoe Johnson King in three separate sessions. 09:45 – 11:15 Chapter 1 & 2 11:30 – 13:00 Chapter 3 & 4 14:30 – 16:00 Chapter 5 & 6 The workshop is organized by the KiC and PACE project. If you plan to come, please register in writing a short mail to sebastian.aster(a)univie.ac.at <mailto:sebastian.aster@univie.ac.at> Best regards, The organizers (Paulina Sliwa & Sebastian Aster)

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Invitiation to the exhibition: Wien und die Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Orte des Wiener Kreises | June 4 - Sept.19, 2025

by Zarah Weiss

Dear everyone, The exhibition "Wien und die Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Orte des Wiener Kreises", curated by Friedrich Stadler and Bernhard Hachleitner, will open at the Wienbibliothek on June 4 at 6.30 pm. More information: https://www.wienbibliothek.at/besuchen-entdecken/ausstellungen/wien-wissens… The opening is in German, however, the exhibition itself is in English and German. Guided tours will be offered, too. The exhibition will be open until September 19, 2025. With best regards, Zarah Weiss -- Zarah Weiss, M.A. (she/her) Institut Wiener Kreis Universität Wien Alser Straße 23 Top 32 A-1080 Wien https://wienerkreis.univie.ac.at M: zarah.weiss(a)univie.ac.at

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How Words Help Us Think – This Friday 30.05 – Nancy Salay

by Joshua Bergamin

Dear colleagues, Just a reminder about the upcoming lecture by Associate Professor Nancy Salay (Queen’s University, Canada) on her new book How Words Help Us Think: An Externalist Account of Representational Intentionality (Bloomsbury, 2025). When: Friday 30 May 2025, 15:00-16:30 Where: Hörsaal 2I (NIG) All welcome. Registration is not necessary, but let me know if you’d like to join us for an apéritif at Café Eiles after the talk, so that I can book a table. Abstract There is general agreement that a capacity to act for reasons is a mark of intentionality. Views differ widely, however, on how ‘acting for reasons’ unpacks. According to the cognitivist tradition in which individuals are the central units of investigation, intentional agents make sense of their world via internal representations variously construed as neural, mental, or, on some reductive accounts, both. On these views, to act for a reason is to be responsive to some representation of the how the world is, was, or could be. How behaviour is guided by explicit use of representations—e.g., deliberation between whether to pick answer A or B on a multiple-choice exam—is taken to be continuous with the way that implicitly representational processes such as perception guide behavior. For 4E theorists, in contrast, intentional agents are not individuals so much as they are continually shifting agent-situation couplings to and from which responses develop, often reciprocally. Intentional agents learn to cope within their world as they move and act within it; their needs and wants develop in accordance with their capacity to skillfully “operate” within ongoing situation landscapes. To ‘act for a reason’ here is to be agentive and responsive in a codeveloping agent-situation. In the context of a comprehensive account of cognition, both views offer important insights. The representational approach brings attention to the cognitive power of explicitly deliberative activity but 4E views explain how operative intentionality grounds actions. In How Words Help Us Think, the book on which this talk is based, these insights are merged. Representations do have a powerful role to play in deliberative processes but not as internal structures that agents “recur” on; rather, they are external tools for spatiotemporally extending the ongoing situations in which intentional agents are always embedded. On this view, a deliberative capacity, what I will be calling “representational intentionality,” is a strongly scaffolded skill rather than a fundamental capacity: while neural activity plays a critical role here, the development of representational intentionality requires in addition a certain kind of environment—one in which there are language practices—and a particular skill with it. My task in this book is to give an account of how representational intentionality develops when the requisite endogenous and exogenous factors are present. In this talk, I will present the arc of the view along with some of the key arguments that support it. -- Dr Joshua Bergamin Co-PI (Musical) Improvisation & Ethics Department of Philosophy University of Vienna www.improv-ethics.net

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In Goethes Auge - Perception, Ontology and Aesthetics of Colours – A Book Presentation - 28.05.25 - 11:00-13:00 - B0305, NiG

by Raphael Gustavo Aybar Valdivia

Dear all, You are cordially invited to the following event: In Goethes Auge - Perception, Ontology and Aesthetics of Colours - A book presentation Anastasia Klug (Humboldt Universität Berlin) When: 11:00-13:00 - Wednesday 28 May 2025 Where: Room B0305, Neues Institutsgebäude (NiG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien Language: Englisch Abstract: Goethe spent many years working on colours, about the way we perceive them, the way they appear in nature, and the way they can be conceptualized from a physical point of view. In 1810 he published his Theory of Colours (Farbenlehre), a non-classificable work about the nature of colours, and, last but not least, their aesthetical value. Indeed, Goethe was primarly interested into colours for aesthetical reasons, even if the scientifical debate about the nature of light plays a decisive role in his investigations. He famously attacked Newton’s theory about the physical heterogeneity of white light and postulated instead that what makes colours appear, is what he calls the polarity between light and darkness. Through the years, this theory led him to the idea that colours can form complementary couples that are particularly harmonious, i.e. that are able to produce valuable aesthetical effects. In Goethes Auge – Wahrnehmung, Ontologie und Ästhetik der Farbe analyses Goethe’s conceptualization of colours as an autonomous aesthetical mean, which permits a radical new artistical use. This publication shows both the originality and the philosophical importance of Goethe’s way to understand colours. What is at stake is the link between perception, which implies a material point of view, and aesthetical judgement in the sense of Kant and Schiller, which is something more than a mere well-being sensation. Goethe’s approach reveals itself as an original position in the German philosophical landscape, characterized by idealism: his Theory of Colours replaces the human being in the nature and its material dimension, without sacrificing or reducing the spiritual side of human existence. Best regards, Raphael Aybar -- MSc. Mag. Raphael Aybar, BA Scientific Coordinator Vienna Doctoral School of Philosophy University of Vienna Universitätsstraße 7, B0301 1010 Wien +43-1-4277-46020 https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/ vd.philosophy(a)univie.ac.at raphael.aybar(a)univie.ac.at

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APSE talk by Veli Mitova (University of Johannesburg) + reading group on Thursday, May 22, 2025

by Ella Valerie Berger

Dear all, we warmly invite you to the next APSE (Applied Philosophy of Science and Epistemology) Talk and Reading Circle. The talk will be held by Veli Mitova (University of Johannesburg). Talk: When: Thursday, 22.05.2025, 15:00 - 17:00 Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien) Hermeneutical Reparations and the Right to be Known According to an increasingly influential view in social epistemology, we owe victims of gross human rights violations not only economic and social reparations, but also reparations for the distinctively epistemic wrongs that attend such violations (Lackey 2022). One type of epistemic reparation is honouring victims' 'right to be known' (_ibid._)--their right to have their true story known. This talk has two aims. First, I argue that the right to be known cannot be successfully exercised in hermeneutically unjust environments, i.e., environments in which the explanatory and epistemic resources of the oppressed do not feature in the mainstream knowledge economy (Dotson 2012, Fricker 2007). Thus, the successful exercise of the right to be known requires what I call hermeneutical reparations. The second aim of the talk is to sketch three distinct kinds of hermeneutical reparations. If the arguments work, we will have put into dialogue two bodies of scholarship that have, curiously, not yet talked to each other. The dialogue will not only be of mutual theoretical benefit to both, but will also up our chances of attaining epistemic justice. Speaker Bio Veli Mitova is Professor in Philosophy and Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science [1] at the University of Johannesburg. She works at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and social epistemology. She is the author of _Believable Evidence_ [2](CUP 2017), and the editor of _Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known_ [3] (forthcoming SI of _Philosophical Studies_), _Epistemic Decolonisation_ [4](2020) and of _The Factive Turn in Epistemology_ [5] (CUP 2018). Before joining the University of Johannesburg in 2015, Veli taught and researched at Universität Wien, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, Rhodes University (her alma mater), and Cambridge (where she obtained her PhD). Reading Circle: When: Thursday, 22.05.2025, 13:00 - 15:00 Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien) We will focus our discussion on a forthcoming article by Veli Mitova (attached pdf): Mitova, V. (2025). Decolonial Epistemic-Authority Reparations. _Episteme_. DOI: 10.1017/epi.2025.2 As introduction to Epistemic Reparations, Veli Mitova suggests the following article: Lackey J. (2022). 'Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known.' _Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association_ 96, 54-89. As introduction to Hermeneutical Injustice: Fricker, M. (2007). Chapter 7: Hermeneutical Injustice. _Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing_. New York: Oxford University Press. Introducing the concept of Contributory Injustice: Dotson, K. (2012). A cautionary tale: on limiting epistemic oppression. _Frontiers - A Journal of Women's Studies_ (1): 24-47. And the latest reading, distinguishing 3 kinds of Hermeneutical Injustice: Catala, A. (2025). Chapter 3: Deliberative Impasses, White Ignoring, and Hermeneutical Domination. _The Dynamics of Epistemic Injustice: Situating Epistemic Power and Agency. _New York: Oxford University Press. All the Best, Ella Berger and Vinzenz Fischer Links: ------ [1] https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/departments-2/philosophy/philosop… [2] http://www.cambridge.org/9781107188600 [3] https://link.springer.com/collections/jhbeccifed [4] https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rppa20/49/2?nav=tocList [5] https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/factive-turn-in-epistemology/A12342A58…

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WG: Invitation/Einladung | Mateusz Salwa: Landscape Aesthetics and Environmental Virtue Ethics | Di., 27.5., 9:45, UniWien

by philosophie＠univie.ac.at

Liebe Kolleg*innen, untenstehend für Sie zur Information. Mit besten Grüßen, ---- Institutskoordination Dipl.-Ing. Katherina Geneviève Krobath, BEd Andreas Wintersperger, MA philosophie(a)univie.ac.at <mailto:philosophie@univie.ac.at> +43(1)4277 46401 Institut für Philosophie Universitätsstraße 7, Raum A316 1010 Wien https://philosophie.univie.ac.at/ Das Institut für Philosophie, die Polnische Akademie der Wissenschaften und die Wiener Gesellschaft für interkulturelle Philosophie laden zum Gastvortrag Landscape Aesthetics and Environmental Virtue Ethics Mateusz Salwa Dienstag, 27. Mai 2025 9:45-11:15 Uhr Institut für Philosophie Hörsaal 3C Universitätsstraße 7 1010 Wien Abstract: Although landscape is defined differently in contemporary humanities, and often in a way that avoids association with aesthetic values, in philosophy, landscape is almost invariably associated with aesthetics. In all its complexity and diversity, the experience of landscape appears as an aesthetic experience. At the same time, attention has recently been drawn to the fact that landscape also has an ethical dimension – landscape ethics has begun to complement landscape aesthetics. Landscape ethics is often equated with the question of the right to landscape, which entails the obligation to relate to landscape in the right way. If one wants to preserve the aesthetic sense of landscape, one way to combine aesthetics and ethics is the recently proposed concept of environmental virtue aesthetics, a modification of environmental virtue ethics. The aim of my talk is to discuss the relationship between landscape aesthetics and landscape ethics, and to point out the glories and shadows of the virtue-oriented approach. Dr. habil. Mateusz Salwa is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw.

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Mini Workshop on AI and Computing TODAY, 17:00 - 19:15, NIG 3D

by Alexander Gschwendtner

Dear all, The Philosophy of Science Group at the Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to this mini workshop, taking place *today, 17:00 - 19:15 at NIG, Room 3D*. You can also join via Zoom: https://univienna.zoom.us/j/61325403480?pwd=csc5Ipp2tkz9MjwbvFioVELyphZW6u.1 *Mini workshop on AI and computing — 20.05.2025* Lecture Room 3D (Room D0316, 3rd floor) Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Vienna Organized by: Univ.-Prof. Tarja Knuuttila 17:00 -18:00 Dr. Nick Wiggershaus (University of Lille) * * *Computational Artifacts and the Problem of Creation* As computer science integrates principles from logic, engineering, and physics, the ontological status of its core entities, such as computer programs, remains contested. Programs are often characterized as hybrids that have a “dual nature.” In attempts to untangle such hybrids, philosophers of computing have applied the concept of ‘technical artifact’ (combining teleological function and physical structure) to computing. While productive, it overlooks a notorious problem from the philosophy of art: the /Problem of Creation/, which asks how abstract objects like musical works or novels can be brought into existence through concrete human activity. I argue that, like repeatable artworks, computational artifacts have different representational modes (e.g., symbolic, mathematical, diagrammatic) and implementational media (e.g., ink on paper, chalk on a whiteboard, electrical signals, punched cards, etc.). Just as a novel or a musical work is not identical to any one performance or copy, a computer program persists across implementations. This invites a philosophical conundrum: How can programmers /create /abstract objects that are not located in space or time? By appropriating solutions to the Problem of Creation, we gain alternative ways to characterize the ontological status of programs and other computing objects. I conclude by exploring whether we can understand computational artifacts as /abstract /technical artifacts. 18:15-19:15 Dr. Laura Savolainen (University of Helsinki) *Emperor’s New Crowds: “Untrustworthy” Workers and “Ground Truth”* Ground-truth datasets are supposed to nail down facts about the “world” represented by data, so that machine learning models trained on them will behave reliably in that same world. Yet when annotation is outsourced to platform workers whom engineers do not know, and often mistrust, how is such reliability achieved or even imagined? Based on 27 interviews with machine learning researchers and practitioners, this paper investigates how ground-truth datasets are stabilised when 1) annotators are positioned as unreliable non-experts, 2) recognised domain experts are prohibitively expensive, and 3) the platform architecture itself suppresses deliberation, feedback, and learning. Given these constraints, I illustrate ground-truthing as a canny, iterative practice shaped by task design choices, aggregation methods, disciplinary conventions, and the affective politics of trusting data supplied by unknown workers. Rather than reflecting the world, the resulting datasets operationalize narrowly bounded problem formulations that satisfy performance goals ‘well enough’ for downstream modelling. By analysing the epistemic hierarchies, organizational constraints and judgment calls embedded in these pipelines, the discussion offers a concrete case for re-evaluating realist assumptions about data, evidence, and representation in contemporary AI research. Moreover, the analysis opens normative space for re-imagining data pipelines around more transparent authority structures and richer human feedback for more reliable processes and outputs. -- Alexander Gschwendtner Universität Wien Institut für Philosophie Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien – Raum A0322 https://ufind.univie.ac.at/de/person.html?id=1009319

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