Dear all,
our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest), who will give a talk on November 12th from 4.45-6.15 pm.
All are welcome!
________________________________________________________________________________
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM TALK:
Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest):
"The Concept of Self and the Meaning of ‘I’ in Logical Empiricism"
Date: 12/11/2026
Time: 16:45-18:15
Venue: Lecture Hall 2, TP (Tiefparterre/lower ground floor),
Staircase 5, Court 3, Main Building, Universitätsring 1, 1010 Vienna
Abstract:
At first glance logical positivists or empiricists seem to have had little to say about the self beyond the verificationist claim that the assumption of a non-empirical, “metaphysical self” is meaningless rather than simply false (a position also held by Mach, James, Russell after 1912, or the pre-positivist Schlick and Carnap). This impression, however, is misleading. Logical empiricists also proposed various scientific successor concepts of the self. Furthermore, they also addressed traditional philosophical problems such as the identification criteria of the self, whether the distinctness of selves is necessary or contingent, and whether a self must attach to a body.
My presentation has two parts. First, I will reconstruct what I take to be the common ground underlying most logical empiricist accounts of the self, already crystalized in Schlick’s and Carnap’s pre-positivist works, General Theory of Knowledge and The Logical Structure of the World. Second, I examine what I regard as some of their original and significant contributions: their use of telepathy thought experiments to explore the concept of the self and the meaning of “I”.
The second part is divided into two subsections.
Telepathy and the physicalism debate.The logical positivists’ analyses of the self were embedded in the broader debate about the appropriate language for scientific discourse. Carnap in his early radical physicalist phase maintained that physical language is the universal language of science and that phenomenal language lacks intersubjective meaning. This position, in contrast to his earlier asymmetric view, committed him to a thoroughly physicalist conception, according to which both our own and others minds are to be identified exclusively by reference to bodily and behavioral states, and the privacy of experience and the distinctness of persons must likewise be accounted for in bodily or neural terms. In defending his claim that phenomenal language cannot be intersubjective, Carnap in “Psychology” (1932) considered and rejected an “objection on the ground of mental telepathy”. Schlick, the leading representative of the phenomenalist wing, also embraced the universality of physical language (in fact, he had already advocated it in GTK, before Carnap), but maintained that phenomenal language, too, could be intersubjectively meaningful. This allowed him to retain a conception of a “phenomenal self”. A central argument in Schlick’s 1936 paper, “Meaning and Verification”, relies on a telepathy thought experiment. I will briefly reconstruct both these arguments.
Telepathy and the meaning of “I”. Schlick’s explorations of telepathy scenarios, both in “Meaning and Verification” and in his 1933–34 Problems of Philosophy lectures (Schlick 1987), also bear on the meaning of “I”. Such thought experiments – for instance, scenarios in which someone experiences pain located in another body – are usually credited to Wittgenstein. However, as I will show, arguments drawing on telepathy scenarios were widespread among logical empiricists and, except for Schlick, did not depend on Wittgenstein’s influence. To substantiate this claim, I will also examine the work Ayer and Reichenbach, who also made use of telepathy scenarios in developing their accounts of the self and the meaning of “I”, arriving at different conclusions.
I conclude by summarizing the main contributions of logical positivist views and their role in preparing the ground for later conceptions of the self in analytic philosophy of mind.