

Lindsay Judson
University of Oxford

[T1] See *Top.* IV.2 121b24-122a2 and 122b3-6; *Top.* VI.6 144b20-25 and VI.4. *Top.* VI.6 144a11-13 and 144b20-25 (on both of these see Brunschwig 1967 lvi-lviii). See also *Top.* VI.13, and Schiaparelli 2023, 312.

[T2] *Phys.* VIII.6 258b10-12

ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ κίνησιν αἰεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τι αἰετὸν ὃ πρῶτον κινεῖ, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πλείω· καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινουὺν ἀκίνητον.

Since there must always be motion and it must not give out, it is necessary that there be something eternal which is the first cause of motion, whether one or many, and that the first mover be unmoved.

[T3] *Phys.* VIII.6 259a6-13

εἴπερ οὖν αἰετὸς ἡ κίνησις, αἰετὸν καὶ τὸ κινουὺν ἔσται πρῶτον, εἴ ἓν· εἰ δὲ πλείω, πλείω τὰ αἰετὰ. ἓν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλά, καὶ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, δεῖ νομίζειν. τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ συμβαινόντων αἰεὶ τὰ πεπερασμένα μᾶλλον ληπτέον· ἓν γὰρ τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἂν ἐνδέχεται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον. ἰκανὸν δὲ καὶ ἓν, ὃ πρῶτον τῶν ἀκινήτων αἰετὸν ὃν ἔσται ἀρχὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κινήσεως.

If the motion is eternal, the first mover will also be eternal, if there is one [mover]; if there are more than one [what], there will be more than one eternal [thing?mover]. But we should suppose one rather than many, and what is finite in number rather than what is infinite. For if the results are the same, we should always assume the finite in number. For in what is by nature what is finite in number and what is better must, if possible, be present rather than the opposite. And in fact it is sufficient for there to be one, which, being the first of unmoved things and eternal, will be the principle of motion in the rest.

[T4] *Phys.* VIII.6 259b28-31

οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑφ' ἑτέρου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ' ἑτέρου ὑπάρχει καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐνίαις ἀρχαῖς, ὅσα πλείους φέρεται φορές, θάτερον δὲ τοῖς φθαρτοῖς μόνον.

Incidental motion of a thing by itself and such motion by something else are not the same thing. For being moved incidentally by another belongs also to certain principles of the things in the heavens – those that undergo more than one motion – but being moved incidentally in the other way belongs only to things which perish.

[T5] *Cael.* II.6 288a27-b7

ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν γίγνεσθαι τῆς κινήσεως ἢ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν ἢ διὰ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ δι' ἄμφω· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ κινεῖν μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει κινεῖ, εἴτε τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ μὴ διαμένει τὸ αὐτό, εἴτε ἄμφω μεταβάλλοι, οὐθὲν κωλύει ἀνωμάλως κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον. οὐθὲν δὲ τούτων δυνατόν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κινούμενον δέδεικται ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ὅλως ἀμετάβλητον, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐλογον εἶναι τοιοῦτον· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγέννητον τοῦ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀγενήτου κινητικόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μεταβάλλει σῶμα ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ κινεῖν μεταβάλλοι ἀσώματον ὄν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν φορὰν ἀδύνατον ἀνώμαλον εἶναι.

Further, since everything moved is moved by something, it is necessary that the irregularity of the movement come to be either because of the mover, or because of the what is moved, or because of both. For if the mover does not move with the same power, or if what is moved alters and does not remain the same, or if both alter, there is nothing to prevent what is moved from moving in an irregular way. But none of these can happen in the heaven. For what is moved has been proved to be primary, simple, ungenerated, unperishing, and altogether unchanging, and it is much more reasonable that the mover is of the same sort; for only what is primary can move the primary, what is simple the simple, what is unperishing and ungenerated the unperishing and ungenerated. Since, then, what is moved – which is a body – does not change, neither will the mover – which is without body – change. Hence it is impossible that the motion be irregular.

[T6] *Cael.* II. 6 288b22-7

ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλογον ἄπειρον χρόνον ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλον ἄπειρον δυνατόν· οὐθὲν γὰρ φαίνεται ὄν ἄπειρον χρόνον παρὰ φύσιν (ἢ δ' ἀδυναμία παρὰ φύσιν), οὐδὲ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδ' ὅλως δυνατόν καὶ ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη δ', εἰ ἀνίησιν ἢ κίνησις, ἄπειρον ἀνιέναι χρόνον.

Further, it is unreasonable that the mover should for an infinite time lack power, and then for another infinite time have power; for it is apparent that nothing exists in a state which is contrary to natural for an infinite time (and lack of power is contrary to nature), nor exists as long in a state which is contrary to nature as in its natural state, nor, for that matter, as long without power as with it. But if the motion slows down, it is necessary that it does so for an infinite time.

[T7] *Cael.* I.8 277b9-12

ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας λόγων δειχθεῖν ἂν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς κύκλω κινήσεως, ἣν ἀναγκαῖον αἰετὶς ὁμοίως ἐνταῦθά τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις κόσμοις.

Further, [the uniqueness of the cosmos] might also be proved by way of the arguments of first philosophy, that is, from the circular motion, which would necessarily be eternal in the same way here and in the other *cosmoi*.

[T8] Pieces of writing which begin with a relatively sweeping or even grand claim: with ‘all or every’: *Post An.*, *PA I*, *Met A*, *EN I*, *Pol.*; others: *Phys I*, *De An.*, *EE*.

[T9] Stylistic evidence of haste in the writing of Λ : one example is *Met.* $\Lambda.3$ 1069b35-1070a5: μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τινος καὶ εἷς τι· ὅφ’ οὗ μὲν, τοῦ πρώτου κινουῦντος· ὁ δέ, ἡ ὕλη· εἷς ὁ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἴσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἐκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία ...

After these things <say> that neither the matter nor the form comes to be – I mean the last ones. For in every case of change, *something* changes, is changed *by* something, and changes *into* something: by what – the first mover; what – the matter; into what – the form. They will go to infinity, then, if not only the bronze comes to be spherical, but also the spherical or the bronze comes to be; hence there must be a stop. After these things <say> that each substance comes to be from a synonym ...

See also $\Lambda.3$ 1070a19; $\Lambda.4$ 1070b19-21; $\Lambda.5$ 1071a8-10; $\Lambda.10$ 1075a25-1076a4

[T10] Gisela Striker 2009, xviii:

... though what we have [in the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*] can be recognised as belonging to the general project (or projects) mentioned at the beginning, the books as we have them no doubt also contain a number of related studies that were originally written as independent essays and are not strictly integrated into the overall structure.

[T11] Lennox 2001, 119:

PA I is generally recognized to be independent of the rest of *PA* and to have the character of a loosely connected set of discussions.

[T12] *Phys.* II.1 193b20-21

εἰ δ’ ἔστιν στέρησις καὶ ἐναντίον τι περὶ τὴν ἀπλὴν γένεσιν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

But whether or not there is a privation and an opposite in coming to be without qualification must be considered later.

[T13] *Meteor.* I.1 338a20-b22 and 339a5-9

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρον καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς κοινῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν δ’ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ πάντες οἱ πρότεροι μετεωρολογίαν ἐκάλουν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ἀτακτοτέραν μὲντοι τῆς τοῦ πρώτου στοιχείου τῶν σωμάτων, περὶ τὸν γεινιῶντα μάλιστα τόπον τῇ φορᾷ τῇ τῶν ἄστρον διελθόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων, θεωρήσωμεν εἴ τι δυνάμεθα κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλόμενον τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν, καθόλου τε καὶ χωρὶς· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ῥηθέντων τέλος ἂν εἴη γεγονὸς τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως πάσης. ὧδ’ οὖν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν πρώτον.

We have earlier spoken about the first causes of nature and about all natural motion, and, further, about the movement in the heavens of the ordered stars, about the number, kinds and mutual transformations of the bodily elements, and about coming to be and ceasing to be insofar as it is common. It remains, further, to consider a part of this inquiry which all of our predecessors called meteorology. This is everything which happens naturally but with less order than that of the primary element of bodies, and which takes place in the region which borders most nearly on the movement of the stars After we have dealt with these subjects, let us then consider if we can give some account, in the way which we have laid down, of animals and plants, both in general and in particular; for when we have spoken of these we may perhaps claim that the whole investigation which we set before ourselves at the outset has been completed (trans. Lee, with modifications)

[T14] PA I. 5 644b31-645a23, with three omissions

ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ τὴν τιμιότητα τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐρωμένων τὸ τυχὸν καὶ μικρὸν μόριον κατιδεῖν ἥδιον ἐστὶν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ μεγάλα δι' ἀκριβείας ἰδεῖν.... ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν, λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις.... διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν.... πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ζώων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον ὥς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ.

Each study has its attractions. Even if our contact with eternal beings is slight, nonetheless because of its surpassing value this knowledge is a greater pleasure than our knowledge of everything around us, even as a chance, brief glimpse of the ones we love is a greater pleasure than seeing accurately many other and great things.... Since we have completed stating the way things appear to us about the divine things, it remains to speak about animal nature, omitting nothing in our power, whether of lesser or greater esteem. For even in the study of animals disagreeable to perception, the nature that crafted them likewise provides extraordinary pleasures to those who are able to know their causes and are by nature philosophers.... For this reason we should not be childishly disgusted at the examination of the less valuable animals. For in all natural things there is something marvellous. One should approach research about each of the animals without disgust, since in every one there is something natural and good (trans. Lennox).

[T15] SE 34 183b34-184b8, with one omission

ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἦν προεξεργασμένον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν.... καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἶχομεν πρότερον λέγειν ἀλλ' ἡ τριβὴ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν, ὥς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων, ἔχειν ἡ μέθοδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἠϋξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἡκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ' εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.

But as for this study, it is not the case that some of it had been worked up before and some had not; rather, nothing existed at all.... Concerning rhetorical matters, there existed the many and venerable works we mentioned, but concerning deduction we previously had absolutely nothing to mention (except to say that we spent much time labouring in exhausting searches). And if the method, having come into being from such beginnings as these, appears to you the spectators to be adequately developed in comparison to the other treatises that have grown out of a tradition, the task that would remain for all of you – or for those who have heard our work – is to pardon the deficiencies of our work and give us much thanks for its discoveries (trans. Smith, with modifications; both text and translation are disputed).

[T16] *EN X.5 1175b10-13*

διὸ χαίροντες ὁτ' αὖ σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾖσι, τότε μάλιστα αὐτὸ δρῶσιν.

That is why if we are enjoying one thing, whatever it may be, we do not engage in another thing very much; it is when something only mildly pleases us that we do other things – for example, people who eat sweets in theatres do this most when the contestants are bad.

[T17] *EN III.2 1111b6-9; EN III.12 1119a33-b15.*

[T18] *Pol. VIII.6 1340b26-9*

καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν οἷσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδῶσι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν.

Archytas' rattle, which they give to children so that by using it they may refrain from breaking things about the house, must be considered a fine invention; for the young cannot keep still.

[T19] *EN 1.6 1096a16-17*

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοι φίλον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Though we love both our friends and the truth, it is only right to love the truth more.

[T20] *Met. Λ.10 1076a4*

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος.

To have many rulers is not good: <let there be> one ruler.

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