Dear all,
our next speaker in the _Philosophy of Science Colloquium_ organized by
the _Institute Vienna Circle_ is Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd
University, Budapest), who will give a talk on November 12th from
4.45-6.15 pm.
All are welcome!
________________________________________________________________________________
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM TALK:
Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest):
"The Concept of Self and the Meaning of 'I' in Logical Empiricism"
Date: 12/11/2026
Time: 16:45-18:15
Venue: Lecture Hall 2 [1], TP (Tiefparterre/lower ground floor),
Staircase 5, Court 3, Main Building, Universitätsring 1, 1010 Vienna
Abstract:
At first glance logical positivists or empiricists seem to have had
little to say about the self beyond the verificationist claim that the
assumption of a non-empirical, "metaphysical self" is meaningless rather
than simply false (a position also held by Mach, James, Russell after
1912, or the pre-positivist Schlick and Carnap). This impression,
however, is misleading. Logical empiricists also proposed various
scientific successor concepts of the self. Furthermore, they also
addressed traditional philosophical problems such as the identification
criteria of the self, whether the distinctness of selves is necessary or
contingent, and whether a self must attach to a body.
My presentation has two parts. First, I will reconstruct what I take to
be the common ground underlying most logical empiricist accounts of the
self, already crystalized in Schlick's and Carnap's pre-positivist
works, _General Theory of Knowledge_ and _The Logical Structure of the
World_. Second, I examine what I regard as some of their original and
significant contributions: their use of telepathy thought experiments to
explore the concept of the self and the meaning of "I".
The second part is divided into two subsections.
_Telepathy and the physicalism debate._The logical positivists' analyses
of the self were embedded in the broader debate about the appropriate
language for scientific discourse. Carnap in his early radical
physicalist phase maintained that physical language is the universal
language of science and that phenomenal language lacks intersubjective
meaning. This position, in contrast to his earlier asymmetric view,
committed him to a thoroughly physicalist conception, according to which
both our own and others minds are to be identified exclusively by
reference to bodily and behavioral states, and the privacy of experience
and the distinctness of persons must likewise be accounted for in bodily
or neural terms. In defending his claim that phenomenal language cannot
be intersubjective, Carnap in "Psychology" (1932) considered and
rejected an "objection on the ground of mental telepathy". Schlick, the
leading representative of the phenomenalist wing, also embraced the
universality of physical language (in fact, he had already advocated it
in _GTK_, before Carnap), but maintained that phenomenal language, too,
could be intersubjectively meaningful. This allowed him to retain a
conception of a "phenomenal self". A central argument in Schlick's 1936
paper, "Meaning and Verification", relies on a telepathy thought
experiment. I will briefly reconstruct both these arguments.
_ Telepathy and the meaning of "I"_. Schlick's explorations of telepathy
scenarios, both in "Meaning and Verification" and in his 1933-34
_Problems of Philosophy_ lectures (Schlick 1987), also bear on the
meaning of "I". Such thought experiments - for instance, scenarios in
which someone experiences pain located in another body - are usually
credited to Wittgenstein. However, as I will show, arguments drawing on
telepathy scenarios were widespread among logical empiricists and,
except for Schlick, did not depend on Wittgenstein's influence. To
substantiate this claim, I will also examine the work Ayer and
Reichenbach, who also made use of telepathy scenarios in developing
their accounts of the self and the meaning of "I", arriving at different
conclusions.
I conclude by summarizing the main contributions of logical positivist
views and their role in preparing the ground for later conceptions of
the self in analytic philosophy of mind.
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Links:
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[1]
https://wienerkreis.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_wiener_kreis/Gebae…
Dear All,
The next talk in the "Wittgenstein=steine" series is this Friday (June
13th) at 3pm in room NIG 3D.
The speaker is Konstantin Deininger, and his title is:
_"On the Material and Formal Aspects of (Moral) Certainty"_.
Abstract:
Does morality have a binding character in the sense that chains of
justification come to an end? In this talk, I will affirm this question
and argue that we can plausibly distinguish between formal and material
aspects of moral certainty. As a starting point, I will interpret
Wittgenstein's idea of "bedrock," introduced in §217 of the
Philosophical Investigations, as standing for the end of a chain of
reasoning. In doing so, I align with certain Wittgensteinian
interpreters who maintain that some chains of moral reasoning end with
certainty. However, I will arrive at deviating conclusions by
demonstrating that different kinds of moral certainties function in
different ways. Wittgensteinian scholars such as Cora Diamond and Nigel
Pleasants correctly identify the formal aspect of moral certainty,
showing that some propositions resist justification and doubt. However,
the candidates for formal certainties they propose do not fully satisfy
the criteria of certainty. This, I argue, is due to their failure to
adequately distinguish between the formal and material aspects of
certainty. Material certainties, such as Diamond's "slavery is unjust
and insupportable" or Pleasants' "killing is wrong," remain intelligible
to some extent and are thus subject to justification and doubt. Still,
these propositions function as regress stoppers by putting an end to the
chain of reasoning--but they do not mark the boundary of the
unintelligible as formal certainties do. Drawing on Wittgenstein's later
writings, I will argue that only formal certainties--which I refer to as
transcendental certainties--are entirely exempt from justification and
doubt. I identify the principle "equals are to be treated equally" as a
plausible candidate for transcendental certainty. This certainty is
foundational to moral reasoning and enables moral thought. I illustrate
its role through debates on justice in animal ethics.
Everybody welcome!
Best wishes from the organizers,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter
Anja Weiberg
Martin Kusch
Liebe Institutsangehörige!
Herzliche Einladung zur Buchpräsentation "Ethik des Widerstands" am 12.11.2026 um 18h im Lesesaal der FB Philosophie und Psychologie
Die Fachbibliothek Philosophie und Psychologie lädt zur Präsentation des Buchs "Ethik des Widerstands. Hobbes - Kant - Hegel - Levinas" von Brigitta Keintzel in den Lesesaal der Fachbibliothek ein.
Weitere Informationen zur Veranstaltung: https://bibliothek.univie.ac.at/events/008886.html
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Die Veranstaltung findet in Kooperation mit den Phänomenologischen Forschungen statt. Alle sind willkommen, und wir freuen uns über eine lebendige Diskussion, gerne zur Rolle des Widerstands an der Schnittstelle von Phänomenologie, Transzendentalphilosophie und idealistischer Philosophie.
Liebe Grüße
Sonja Fiala
OR Mag. Sonja Fiala
Leitung Fachbibliothek Philosophie und Psychologie
Bibliotheks- und Archivwesen
Universität Wien
Universitätsstraße 7, Stiege II, 3. Stock, 1010 Wien
T: +43-4277-15079
sonja.fiala(a)univie.ac.at<mailto:sonja.fiala@univie.ac.at>
bibliothek.univie.ac.at/fb-philosophie-psychologie<https://bibliothek.univie.ac.at/fb-philosophie-psychologie/>
Lehrbeauftragte im ULG Library and Information Studies
ORDIC iD https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5492-8934