Dear all,
our next speaker in the _Philosophy of Science Colloquium_ organized by
the _Institute Vienna Circle_ is Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd
University, Budapest), who will give a talk on November 12th from
4.45-6.15 pm.
All are welcome!
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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM TALK:
Gergely Ambrus (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest):
"The Concept of Self and the Meaning of 'I' in Logical Empiricism"
Date: 12/11/2026
Time: 16:45-18:15
Venue: Lecture Hall 2 [1], TP (Tiefparterre/lower ground floor),
Staircase 5, Court 3, Main Building, Universitätsring 1, 1010 Vienna
Abstract:
At first glance logical positivists or empiricists seem to have had
little to say about the self beyond the verificationist claim that the
assumption of a non-empirical, "metaphysical self" is meaningless rather
than simply false (a position also held by Mach, James, Russell after
1912, or the pre-positivist Schlick and Carnap). This impression,
however, is misleading. Logical empiricists also proposed various
scientific successor concepts of the self. Furthermore, they also
addressed traditional philosophical problems such as the identification
criteria of the self, whether the distinctness of selves is necessary or
contingent, and whether a self must attach to a body.
My presentation has two parts. First, I will reconstruct what I take to
be the common ground underlying most logical empiricist accounts of the
self, already crystalized in Schlick's and Carnap's pre-positivist
works, _General Theory of Knowledge_ and _The Logical Structure of the
World_. Second, I examine what I regard as some of their original and
significant contributions: their use of telepathy thought experiments to
explore the concept of the self and the meaning of "I".
The second part is divided into two subsections.
_Telepathy and the physicalism debate._The logical positivists' analyses
of the self were embedded in the broader debate about the appropriate
language for scientific discourse. Carnap in his early radical
physicalist phase maintained that physical language is the universal
language of science and that phenomenal language lacks intersubjective
meaning. This position, in contrast to his earlier asymmetric view,
committed him to a thoroughly physicalist conception, according to which
both our own and others minds are to be identified exclusively by
reference to bodily and behavioral states, and the privacy of experience
and the distinctness of persons must likewise be accounted for in bodily
or neural terms. In defending his claim that phenomenal language cannot
be intersubjective, Carnap in "Psychology" (1932) considered and
rejected an "objection on the ground of mental telepathy". Schlick, the
leading representative of the phenomenalist wing, also embraced the
universality of physical language (in fact, he had already advocated it
in _GTK_, before Carnap), but maintained that phenomenal language, too,
could be intersubjectively meaningful. This allowed him to retain a
conception of a "phenomenal self". A central argument in Schlick's 1936
paper, "Meaning and Verification", relies on a telepathy thought
experiment. I will briefly reconstruct both these arguments.
_ Telepathy and the meaning of "I"_. Schlick's explorations of telepathy
scenarios, both in "Meaning and Verification" and in his 1933-34
_Problems of Philosophy_ lectures (Schlick 1987), also bear on the
meaning of "I". Such thought experiments - for instance, scenarios in
which someone experiences pain located in another body - are usually
credited to Wittgenstein. However, as I will show, arguments drawing on
telepathy scenarios were widespread among logical empiricists and,
except for Schlick, did not depend on Wittgenstein's influence. To
substantiate this claim, I will also examine the work Ayer and
Reichenbach, who also made use of telepathy scenarios in developing
their accounts of the self and the meaning of "I", arriving at different
conclusions.
I conclude by summarizing the main contributions of logical positivist
views and their role in preparing the ground for later conceptions of
the self in analytic philosophy of mind.
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Links:
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[1]
https://wienerkreis.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_wiener_kreis/Gebae…