Postdoc Day - 12 June 2025 - 10:00-13:00
Dear postdocs of the Department of Philosophy,
The Vienna Doctoral School, together with the Postdoc Career Development
Unit at the University of Vienna, is organising a Postdoc Day for the
first time. There will also be an opportunity to socialise over snacks
and drinks. Here is a brief description of the event:
Postdoc Career Day
12 June 2025, 10:00–13:00
3A NiG, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Vienna
Kick off with a hands-on workshop led by career coach Martin Buxbaum
(LBG Career Centre), exploring diverse opportunities outside academia.
You will also have the opportunity to learn about the various career
development resources available with Madeleine Harbich from the
University of Vienna's Postdoc Career Development project. You can then
stay for informal networking over snacks and drinks with pre- and
post-docs, as well as a support session—a chance to ask questions, make
connections, and plan your next move.
10:00-11:45 - Workshop: Careers Beyond Academia (Trainer: Martin
Buxbaum)
11:45-12:00 - Career Development Opportunities for Postdocs (Speaker:
Madeleine Harbich)
12:00-13:00 - Praedoc-Postdoc Networking and Individual Support Session
In order to support us with the planning of the event, we kindly ask you
to register via u:rise. You can log in using your Uni Wien user ID.
https://urise.univie.ac.at/mod/booking/optionview.php?optionid=985&cmid=292…
Best,
Raphael
--
MSc. Mag. Raphael Aybar, BA
Scientific Coordinator
Vienna Doctoral School of Philosophy
University of Vienna
Universitätsstraße 7, B0301
1010 Wien
+43-1-4277-46020
https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/
vd.philosophy(a)univie.ac.at
raphael.aybar(a)univie.ac.at
Liebe alle,
wir laden herzlich zur nächsten Fakultätsöffentlichen Präsentation (FöP) ein.
Am Mittwoch, den 4. Juni 2025 präsentieren drei Kandidat*innen ihre Dissertationsvorhaben im Hörsaal 2G (NIG, 2. Stock). Im Anschluss an die Präsentationen laden wir zu einem Austausch bei Sekt und Sushi ein.
Programm:
13:15 Uhr
Boda Liu, BA MA
Das Leib-Ich:
Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie
Betreuung:
Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz.
13:45 Uhr
Eric Archambault, MA
Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics
Betreuung:
Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer
14:15 Uhr
Peter Schneider, BA MA
Morbide Faszination.
Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil
Betreuung:
Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz.
Wir freuen uns sehr auf Ihre Teilnahme!
Die Einladung kann gerne mit interessierten Personen geteilt werden.
Mit herzlichen Grüßen
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz
Studienprogrammleitung Doktoratsstudium Philosophie (SPL 43)
***
Dear all,
We warmly invite you to the next Public Faculty Presentation (FöP).
On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 1:15 p.m. in Lecture Hall 2G (NIG, 2nd floor), three candidates will present their dissertation projects. Following the presentations, we once again invite you to join us for a reception with sparkling wine and sushi.
Programme:
1:15 p.m.
Boda Liu, BA MA
Das Leib-Ich: Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie
Supervisor:
Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz.
1:45 p.m.
Eric Archambault, MA
Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics
Supervisor:
Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer
2:15 p.m.
Peter Schneider, BA MA
Morbide Faszination. Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil
Supervisor:
Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz.
We are very much looking forward to your participation!
Feel free to share this invitation with anyone who might be interested.
With best wishes,
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz
Director of the Doctoral Program in Philosophy (SPL 43)
Dear all,
You are hereby invited to the next "Physics meets Philosophy" talk
(organized in cooperation with the Institute for Quantum Optics and
Quantum Information) by
Boris Kožnjak (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)
Title: Metaphysical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: An Aristotelian
Perspective (see abstract below)
Date: June 5th (Thursday)
Time: 13:30-15:00
Location: IQOQI Seminar room (Boltzmanngasse 3, 2nd floor)
Zoom link (for those that cannot join in person):
https://univienna.zoom.us/j/62865750030?pwd=Fe2gRi4waS8oramaalaIP2zvDPdLfb.1
Abstract:
Since the earliest days of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, efforts have
been made to establish its metaphysical foundations. One of the earliest
of these was proposed by Werner Heisenberg, one of the theory’s founding
figures, who suggested that such foundations might be found in
Aristotle’s metaphysics, particularly in the concepts of potentiality
(dunamis) and actuality (energeia). Although this perspective has since
evolved into various dispositional interpretations of quantum mechanics,
little attention has been paid to what these metaphysical foundations
would indeed look like when grounded in Aristotle’s original philosophy,
a project Heisenberg outlined only in broad strokes. Drawing on the
author’s previous work, this lecture will explore the historical and
philosophical dimensions of an Aristotelian interpretation of quantum
mechanics, aiming to remain as faithful as possible to Aristotle’s
metaphysical framework.
For more information on "Physics meets Philosophy", see
https://sites.google.com/view/physphilvienna
Best wishes
Sebastian
Liebe alle,
wir laden herzlich zur nächsten Fakultätsöffentlichen Präsentation von Dissertationsprojekten der Philosophie (FöP) ein.
Am Mittwoch, den 4. Juni 2025 präsentieren drei Kandidat*innen ihre Dissertationsvorhaben im Hörsaal 2G (NIG, 2. Stock).
Im Anschluss an die Präsentationen laden wir zu einem Austausch bei Sekt und Sushi ein.
Programm:
13:15 Uhr
Boda Liu, BA MA
Das Leib-Ich: Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie
Betreuung:
Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz.
13:45 Uhr
Eric Archambault, MA
Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics
Betreuung:
Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer
14:15 Uhr
Peter Schneider, BA MA
Morbide Faszination. Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil
Betreuung:
Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz.
Wir freuen uns sehr auf Ihre Teilnahme!
Die Einladung kann gerne mit interessierten Personen geteilt werden.
Mit herzlichen Grüßen
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz
Studienprogrammleitung Doktoratsstudium Philosophie (SPL 43)
***
Dear all,
We warmly invite you to the next Public Faculty Presentation of Dissertation Projects in Philosophy (FöP).
On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 1:15 p.m. in Lecture Hall 2G (NIG, 2nd floor), three candidates will present their dissertation projects.
Following the presentations, we once again invite you to join us for a reception with sparkling wine and sushi.
Programme:
1:15 p.m.
Boda Liu, BA MA
Das Leib-Ich: Reflexionen aus der Perspektive der generativen Phänomenologie
Supervisor:
Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz.
1:45 p.m.
Eric Archambault, MA
Essays on Aristotle and philosophy of mathematics
Supervisor:
Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Georg Schiemer
2:15 p.m.
Peter Schneider, BA MA
Morbide Faszination. Zum persönlichen und theoretischen Verhältnis von Georges Bataille und Simone Weil
Supervisor:
Assoz. Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Dr. Esther Heinrich, Privatdoz.
We are very much looking forward to your participation!
Feel free to share this invitation with anyone who might be interested.
With best wishes,
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Holger Moritz
Director of the Doctoral Program in Philosophy (SPL 43)
Dear all,
we warmly invite you to the next APSE (Applied Philosophy of Science and
Epistemology) Talk and Reading Circle. The talk will be held by Matteo Vagelli
(Ca' Foscari University of Venice). Everybody is welcome.
1. TALK:
When: Thursday, 05.06.2025, 15:00 - 17:00
Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien)
Title: Understanding Scientific Knowledge in Terms of Styles of Reasoning
Abstract:
In this talk, I develop a more precise epistemological account of styles of
reasoning (e.g. Crombie 1992; Davidson 2001; Elwick 2007; Hacking 1982, 1992,
2012; Kwa 2011; Radick 2000). I begin by situating the notion in relation to
general logical modes of inference—deduction, induction, and abduction—
highlighting its distinctive role in shaping scientific rationality. I then
try to advance styles of reasoning as potential candidates to come to terms
with scientific progress, understood both in relation to justification
(Stegenga 2026) and understanding (Déllsen 2016), as well as with scientific
pluralism, especially under its “interactive” account (Chang 2024).
Next, I refine the distinction between two levels of styles: Level 1, large-
scale styles of scientific reasoning (e.g. postulation, experimentation,
modelling, taxonomy, statistics, historical development), and Level 2, small-
scale inferential strategies operative within specific scientific practices
(Bueno 2012). I argue that meaningful philosophical analysis of science
requires attention to both levels and propose the addition of a local level—a
more context-sensitive scale that captures the dynamic interaction between the
two.
To substantiate this claim, I examine contemporary research on Alzheimer’s
disease (Bemelmans et al. 2016; Hardy & Higgins 1992; Schermer, 2023),
illustrating how local configurations of reasoning styles mediate between
broader methodological commitments and specific inferential moves. This case
is particularly relevant, as it highlights the interplay between epistemic and
non-epistemic factors in shaping scientific inquiry. By tracing how styles of
reasoning operate across different levels within this research domain, the
case study anchors the theoretical reflections and demonstrates how styles
serve as a bridge between the logical and the social dimensions of scientific
practice.
By integrating conceptual refinement with empirical analysis, the talk aims to
strengthen the epistemological foundations of the styles of reasoning
framework and enhance its relevance for current debates on plurality,
understanding, and the dynamics of scientific change. In doing so, it also
seeks to render the framework more responsive to at least some of the
criticisms that have been levelled against it (e.g. Kusch 2010; Rouse 2011).
2. READING CIRCLE:
When: Thursday, 05.06.2025, 13:15 - 14:45
Where: HS 3A, NIG (Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien)
We will focus on an article by Matteo Vagelli (attached as PDF):
Vagelli, Matteo (2024). Styles of Science and the Pluralist Turn: Between
Inclusion and Exclusion. Revue de Synthèse 145 (3-4): 325-363. https://
doi.org/10.1163/19552343-14234053
For further reading regarding the topic:
Bueno, Otavio. (2012). “Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view.” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 43: 657-665. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.shpsa.2012.07.008
Daston, L. and Otte, M. (1991) “Introduction”, Science in Context, 4 (2): 223–
232. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700000946
Vagelli, M. (2024). “Hacking’s Styles of Scientific Reasoning.” In:
Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. French and Anglophone Styles in History
and Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_8
Vagelli, M. (2024). “Styles of Science, Styles of Philosophy.” In:
Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. French and Anglophone Styles in History
and Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-031-61555-9_9
Wessely, A. (1991) “Transposing ‘Style’ from the History of Art to the History
of Science”, Science in Context, 4 (2): 265–278. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S026988970000096X
With best wishes,
Miguel de la Riva
--
https://bsky.app/profile/m-de-la-riva.bsky.social
Dear all,
We are happy to invite you to a workshop with Zoe A. Johnson King (Harvard University) on “Praiseworthiness” taking place on June 11th, from 9:45 to 16:00 at Sensengasse 8/10.
Zoe Johnson King is a leading figure in the philosophical debate on (moral) praise and praiseworthiness. The existing literature in moral responsibility and attached fields is primarily concerned with (moral) blame and blameworthiness which is why Zoe Johnson King has dedicated her upcoming book to the topic of praiseworthiness.
The full book manuscript can be downloaded on her personal website: https://www.zoejohnsonking.com/research
We are going to discuss the book together with Zoe Johnson King in three separate sessions.
09:45 – 11:15 Chapter 1 & 2
11:30 – 13:00 Chapter 3 & 4
14:30 – 16:00 Chapter 5 & 6
The workshop is organized by the KiC and PACE project.
If you plan to come, please register in writing a short mail to sebastian.aster(a)univie.ac.at <mailto:sebastian.aster@univie.ac.at>
Best regards,
The organizers (Paulina Sliwa & Sebastian Aster)

Dear everyone,
The exhibition "Wien und die Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Orte des
Wiener Kreises", curated by
Friedrich Stadler and Bernhard Hachleitner, will open at the
Wienbibliothek on June 4 at 6.30 pm.
More information:
https://www.wienbibliothek.at/besuchen-entdecken/ausstellungen/wien-wissens…
The opening is in German, however, the exhibition itself is in English
and German.
Guided tours will be offered, too.
The exhibition will be open until September 19, 2025.
With best regards,
Zarah Weiss
--
Zarah Weiss, M.A.
(she/her)
Institut Wiener Kreis
Universität Wien
Alser Straße 23 Top 32
A-1080 Wien
https://wienerkreis.univie.ac.at
M: zarah.weiss(a)univie.ac.at
Dear colleagues,
Just a reminder about the upcoming lecture by Associate Professor Nancy Salay (Queen’s University, Canada) on her new book How Words Help Us Think: An Externalist Account of Representational Intentionality (Bloomsbury, 2025).
When: Friday 30 May 2025, 15:00-16:30
Where: Hörsaal 2I (NIG)
All welcome. Registration is not necessary, but let me know if you’d like to join us for an apéritif at Café Eiles after the talk, so that I can book a table.
Abstract
There is general agreement that a capacity to act for reasons is a mark of intentionality. Views differ widely, however, on how ‘acting for reasons’ unpacks.
According to the cognitivist tradition in which individuals are the central units of investigation, intentional agents make sense of their world via internal representations variously construed as neural, mental, or, on some reductive accounts, both. On these views, to act for a reason is to be responsive to some representation of the how the world is, was, or could be. How behaviour is guided by explicit use of representations—e.g., deliberation between whether to pick answer A or B on a multiple-choice exam—is taken to be continuous with the way that implicitly representational processes such as perception guide behavior.
For 4E theorists, in contrast, intentional agents are not individuals so much as they are continually shifting agent-situation couplings to and from which responses develop, often reciprocally. Intentional agents learn to cope within their world as they move and act within it; their needs and wants develop in accordance with their capacity to skillfully “operate” within ongoing situation landscapes. To ‘act for a reason’ here is to be agentive and responsive in a codeveloping agent-situation.
In the context of a comprehensive account of cognition, both views offer important insights. The representational approach brings attention to the cognitive power of explicitly deliberative activity but 4E views explain how operative intentionality grounds actions. In How Words Help Us Think, the book on which this talk is based, these insights are merged. Representations do have a powerful role to play in deliberative processes but not as internal structures that agents “recur” on; rather, they are external tools for spatiotemporally extending the ongoing situations in which intentional agents are always embedded.
On this view, a deliberative capacity, what I will be calling “representational intentionality,” is a strongly scaffolded skill rather than a fundamental capacity: while neural activity plays a critical role here, the development of representational intentionality requires in addition a certain kind of environment—one in which there are language practices—and a particular skill with it. My task in this book is to give an account of how representational intentionality develops when the requisite endogenous and exogenous factors are present. In this talk, I will present the arc of the view along with some of the key arguments that support it.
--
Dr Joshua Bergamin
Co-PI
(Musical) Improvisation & Ethics
Department of Philosophy
University of Vienna
www.improv-ethics.net
Dear all,
You are cordially invited to the following event:
In Goethes Auge - Perception, Ontology and Aesthetics of Colours - A
book presentation
Anastasia Klug (Humboldt Universität Berlin)
When: 11:00-13:00 - Wednesday 28 May 2025
Where: Room B0305, Neues Institutsgebäude (NiG), Universitätsstraße 7,
1010 Wien
Language: Englisch
Abstract:
Goethe spent many years working on colours, about the way we perceive
them, the way they appear in nature, and the way they can be
conceptualized from a physical point of view. In 1810 he published his
Theory of Colours (Farbenlehre), a non-classificable work about the
nature of colours, and, last but not least, their aesthetical value.
Indeed, Goethe was primarly interested into colours for aesthetical
reasons, even if the scientifical debate about the nature of light plays
a decisive role in his investigations. He famously attacked Newton’s
theory about the physical heterogeneity of white light and postulated
instead that what makes colours appear, is what he calls the polarity
between light and darkness. Through the years, this theory led him to
the idea that colours can form complementary couples that are
particularly harmonious, i.e. that are able to produce valuable
aesthetical effects. In Goethes Auge – Wahrnehmung, Ontologie und
Ästhetik der Farbe analyses Goethe’s conceptualization of colours as an
autonomous aesthetical mean, which permits a radical new artistical use.
This publication shows both the originality and the philosophical
importance of Goethe’s way to understand colours. What is at stake is
the link between perception, which implies a material point of view, and
aesthetical judgement in the sense of Kant and Schiller, which is
something more than a mere well-being sensation. Goethe’s approach
reveals itself as an original position in the German philosophical
landscape, characterized by idealism: his Theory of Colours replaces the
human being in the nature and its material dimension, without
sacrificing or reducing the spiritual side of human existence.
Best regards,
Raphael Aybar
--
MSc. Mag. Raphael Aybar, BA
Scientific Coordinator
Vienna Doctoral School of Philosophy
University of Vienna
Universitätsstraße 7, B0301
1010 Wien
+43-1-4277-46020
https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/
vd.philosophy(a)univie.ac.at
raphael.aybar(a)univie.ac.at