Reminder: Dear all, There will be a one-day workshop on Semantic Indecision tomorrow (5 March 2026). Anyone interested is cordially invited to attend. The schedule, including titles and abstracts, is below. Best, Max. KiC Workshop on Semantic Indecision 5 March 2026 Room 3A, NIG, Universitätsstr 7, 3rd floor 10–11.15 Bryan Pickel, Glasgow: "Immanent Interpretation” 11.30–12.45 Emelia Stanley, Vienna: "Formalising Open Texture" lunch 14.15–15.30 Richard Lawrence, Vienna: "Sharp definitions of concepts and the chaos of experience" 15.45–17.00 Max Kölbel, Vienna: “A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy” 17.15–18.30 John MacFarlane, Berkeley: “Felicitous Underspecification" Bryan Pickel, University of Glasgow (joint work with Derek Ball, University of St Andrews): "Immanent Interpretation” Abstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all, or a substantial fragment, of language is indeterminate in meaning. According to these arguments, if a speaker uses a sentence to express a proposition in a context, then an interpreter must (in principle at least) have more evidence favouring this proposition as the correct interpretation rather than rival interpretations. These arguments appeal to the claim that the interpreter or audience does not have sufficient evidence favouring one interpretation over its rivals. We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users. But, our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments. We construct a research strategy—immanent interpretation—for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments. We conclude by discussing important limitations on immanent interpretation. Emelia Stanley, University of Vienna: "Formalising Open Texture" Abstract: Waismann’s (1947) notion of open texture captures a species of (non‐sorietal) semantic‐ and truth‐vagueness: that a concept can both apply and disapply to some given case, within a context of application. Noting that open texture resists characterisation in a classical framework, I present an original formalisation the notion. Using this model I then conjecture, contra Waismann, that open‐texture does not only occur in mathematics, but that it plays an indispensable role in characterising its epistemology, and particularly its resolution strategies for crises of non‐trivial disagreement. Richard Lawrence, University of Vienna: "Sharp definitions of concepts and the chaos of experience" Abstract: Frege insists that, for logical purposes, concepts must be sharply defined, and this assumption is now deeply embedded in our contemporary approaches to semantics. Yet we have lost track of one of the background assumptions of classical German philosophy which was part of Frege's reason for that insistence: the idea that experience is initially an unstructured chaos, on which we must impose structure by actively seeking to grasp concepts in thought. I will argue that this background played an important role in some of Frege's semantic ideas, and that it is worth revisiting as we try to characterize phenomena like vagueness. Max Kölbel, University of Vienna: “A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy” Abstract: So-called "felicitous underspecification" seems to be ubiquitous. Nevertheless communication succeeds effortlessly. A number of theorists (e.g. Viebahn, MacFarlane, King and others) have made proposals as to how semanticists should model this phenomenon. Some have proposed new-fangled semantic contents to do justice to the phenomenon. Others have offered pragmatic explanations of communicative success. In this talk, I want to draw attention to a third, more conservative approach that can at least in some cases be employed to explain what is going on. John MacFarlane, University of California at Berkeley: "Felicitous Underspecification” Abstract: In recent work, Jeffrey King has called our attention to the problem of "felicitous underspecification": felicitous uses of context-sensitive language in the absence of determinate intentions about the needed contextual supplementation. An example would be talk of a "local shop" in the absence of a determinate intention about whether we mean local-to-the-city or local-to-the-county. After discussing the problems raised by this phenomenon, I consider King's own solution and argue that it is inadequate. I then describe the solution I think is needed, which makes use of the basic ideas of Allan Gibbard's plan expressivism. According to this approach, ordinary descriptive claims like "I went to a local bar" must be understood as expressive of practical plans for the use of words, as well as ordinary beliefs. Indeterminacy amounts to practical indecision. ––––––––––––––––––––– Max Kölbel Institut für Philosophie Institutsvorstand Head of Department Professur für analytische Philosophie und Sprachphilosophie Chair of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language Philosophy as Conceptual Engagement (PACE), FWF doc.funds project https://pace.phl.univie.ac.at/ Knowledge in Crisis, FWF Cluster of Excellence project https://www.knowledgeincrisis.com/ Universität Wien Universitätsstraße 7 (NIG) 1010 Wien Austria Tel: +43 1 4277 46470 max.koelbel(a)univie.ac.at