9 Jun
2025
9 Jun
'25
5:37 p.m.
Dear All,
The next talk in the "Wittgenstein=steine" series is this Friday (June
13th) at 3pm in room NIG 3D.
The speaker is Konstantin Deininger, and his title is:
_"On the Material and Formal Aspects of (Moral) Certainty"_.
Abstract:
Does morality have a binding character in the sense that chains of
justification come to an end? In this talk, I will affirm this question
and argue that we can plausibly distinguish between formal and material
aspects of moral certainty. As a starting point, I will interpret
Wittgenstein's idea of "bedrock," introduced in §217 of the
Philosophical Investigations, as standing for the end of a chain of
reasoning. In doing so, I align with certain Wittgensteinian
interpreters who maintain that some chains of moral reasoning end with
certainty. However, I will arrive at deviating conclusions by
demonstrating that different kinds of moral certainties function in
different ways. Wittgensteinian scholars such as Cora Diamond and Nigel
Pleasants correctly identify the formal aspect of moral certainty,
showing that some propositions resist justification and doubt. However,
the candidates for formal certainties they propose do not fully satisfy
the criteria of certainty. This, I argue, is due to their failure to
adequately distinguish between the formal and material aspects of
certainty. Material certainties, such as Diamond's "slavery is unjust
and insupportable" or Pleasants' "killing is wrong," remain
intelligible
to some extent and are thus subject to justification and doubt. Still,
these propositions function as regress stoppers by putting an end to the
chain of reasoning--but they do not mark the boundary of the
unintelligible as formal certainties do. Drawing on Wittgenstein's later
writings, I will argue that only formal certainties--which I refer to as
transcendental certainties--are entirely exempt from justification and
doubt. I identify the principle "equals are to be treated equally" as a
plausible candidate for transcendental certainty. This certainty is
foundational to moral reasoning and enables moral thought. I illustrate
its role through debates on justice in animal ethics.
Everybody welcome!
Best wishes from the organizers,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter
Anja Weiberg
Martin Kusch
8 Oct
8 Oct
12:48 p.m.
New subject: Wittgen=steine talks in Winter Term
Dear All,
The "Wittgen=steine" talks continue in Winter Term. Here are the titles
and abstracts:
Andreas Krebs
Unabgeschlossenes Denken: Wittgenstein über Gewissheit
Friday, November 28th, 2025, 3-4:30pm, HS 3B
Abstract: Wittgensteins Über Gewissheit - ein Text, der Sätze wie „Dies
ist meine Hand", „Die Erde ist sehr alt", „Es war noch niemand auf dem
Mond" verhandelt - wird häufig als philosophisches Werk gelesen, das
eine kohärente Theorie unhintergehbarer Selbstverständlichkeiten
enthalte. Forschungskontroversen drehen sich oft darum, um welche
Theorie es sich hierbei handeln soll. Diese Art, sich mit Über
Gewissheit auseinander zu setzen, ist aus mindestens drei Gründen
problematisch: Erstens ist Über Gewissheit kein Werk, sondern eine
posthume Kompilation fragmentarischer Notizen; viele vermeintliche
theoretische Zentralbegriffe - etwa „Fundament", „Weltbild" oder „Angel"
- tauchen nur in wenigen Aufzeichnungen auf, deren Datierung zudem
nahelegt, dass Wittgenstein sich bloß kurzzeitig mit jenen Begriffen
beschäftigt hat. Zweitens bilden Gewissheiten keine homogene Klasse,
sondern eine Familie, deren Mitglieder durch Ähnlichkeiten und Übergänge
verbunden sind, ohne auf gemeinsame Merkmale reduzierbar zu sein;
etliche pointierte Beobachtungen Wittgensteins, die in der Diskussion
verallgemeinert werden, treffen tatsächlich nur auf bestimmte
Gewissheiten zu und auf andere nicht. Drittens gibt es in dem
Textmaterial, das in Über Gewissheit zusammengestellt wurde,
unauflösbare Spannungen und Widersprüche; Wittgenstein hat offenbar
nicht zu Beschreibungen der Phänomene gefunden, die er selbst als
zufriedenstellend hätte gelten lassen können. So lässt sich Über
Gewissheit als Dokument einer Denkbemühung lesen, die faktisch nicht zum
Abschluss kommt - und vielleicht prinzipiell nicht kommen kann.
Gisela Bengtsson
Wittgenstein, Frege and the character of philosophical discourse
Friday, January 16th, 2026, 3-4:30pm, HS 3F
Abstract: In this talk I will explore Frege's descriptions of the role
of elucidatory prose in his project and his demarcation of it from
scientific discourse. I will focus on the assumption that Wittgenstein
conceives of these remarks as a possible answer to the question of what
characterizes philosophical discourse. I will compare passages from
Frege discussions of elucidations to remarks in the so-called chapter on
philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations. The point of the
comparison will be to bring out lines of continuity between Frege's
distinction between elucidatory prose and scientific discourse, and the
demarcation of science from philosophy found in the Philosophical
Investigations. Wittgenstein's wordings in some of these passages
coincide with or echo Frege's choice of words. A further assumption that
will be discussed is that Frege's conception of elucidatory prose to a
large extent shapes the form of presentation that Wittgenstein develops
over time and uses in the Philosophical Investigations.
Everybody welcome!
Best wishes from the organizers,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter
Anja Weiberg
Martin Kusch
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Martin Kusch