June 2024 - Iris - Philosophy bulletin board

Reminder: International Conference: Feyerabend and Austrian Philosophy - His Formative Years in Postwar Vienna | July 5-6

by Zarah Weiss

INVITATION Paul Feyerabend and Austrian Philosophy - His Formative Years in Postwar Vienna International Conference - July 5-6, 2024 University of Vienna, Aula at Campus, Court 1, Entrance 1.11 <https://www.pkfcentennial.org/> https://www.pkfcentennial.org/ Paul K. Feyerabend (1924-1994), one of the most stimulating and controversial figures of Twentieth-Century philosophy, spent most of his formative years in postwar Vienna (1946-1955). Born in Red Vienna, Feyerabend came of age at the time of the Nazi Anschluss and completed his philosophical apprenticeship at the University of Vienna during the Allied occupation. At the time of his university studies in philosophy and physics, Feyerabend animated the so-called Third Vienna Circle (1949-1953) around Viktor Kraft in the context of the Austrian College Society, and actively participated in the European Forum Alpbach and in the Institut für Wissenschaft und Kunst. In addition, he served as a research assistant to Arthur Pap, who spent 1953/54 as a Fulbright visiting professor at the University of Vienna. The international conference Paul Feyerabend and Austrian Philosophy aims at exploring the milieu which shaped Feyerabends intellectual development with a focus on his interaction with university teachers and intellectual figures such as members of the former Vienna Circle like Viktor Kraft, Philipp Frank, Herbert Feigl, and Rudolf Carnap, physicists like Felix Ehrenhaft and Walter Thirring, as well as with Walter Hollitscher and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Contacts continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s at the London School of Economics with Karl Popper and, later, with Imre Lakatos, and in Minneapolis, at Feigls Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, where Feyerabend published his pathbreaking Against Method for the first time in 1970. A special symposium on the publication of Feyerabends Formative Years, edited by Matteo Collodel and Eric Oberheim (Springer Nature, two volumes) will be held as part of this conference. The conference is organized by the Institute Vienna Circle (University of Vienna) and by the Vienna Circle Society. It is partnered with the subsequent HOPOS 2024, the Fifteenth International Congress of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, University of Vienna, July 8-12, 2024, and it contributes to the Feyerabend 2024 Centennial celebrations. Keynote Speakers: Vasso Kindi (University of Athens) Martin Kusch (University of Vienna) Speakers: Ulrich Arnswald, Jordi Cat, David Chandler, Matteo Collodel, Margaretha Hendrickx, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Rita Kimijima-Dennemayer, Artur Koterski, Daniel Kuby, Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, Eric Oberheim, John Preston, Marij van Strien, Gerrit Tiefenthal, Natalia Tomashpolskaja Registration required ( <mailto:vcs@univie.ac.at> vcs(a)univie.ac.at) There will be no registration fee. Organizing Committee: Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna) Matteo Collodel (Ca Foscari University of Venice) Daniel Kuby (University of Konstanz) Queries and Questions: matteo.collodel[at] <http://unive.it> unive.it friedrich.stadler[at] <http://univie.ac.at> univie.ac.at For more information visit: <https://vcs.univie.ac.at/> https://vcs.univie.ac.at/ In addition: Wiener Vorlesung <https://vorlesungen.wien.gv.at/paul-feyerabend-04072024/> Panel Discussion on the occassion of the centennial of the Vienna Circle (Schlick Circle) and Paul Feyerabend July 4, 2024, Town Hall, 5pm (Panel: Helga Nowotny, Elisabeth Nemeth, Karl Sigmund, Friedrich Stadler)

3 months, 4 weeks

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Phänomenologische Forschungen - 26. Juni 2024 - David W. Johnson: Intersubjective Phenomenality: Kimura, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt (Vortrag)

by Institut für Philosophie

Phänomenologische Forschungen - 26. Juni 2024 - David W. Johnson: Intersubjective Phenomenality: Kimura, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt (Vortrag) Liebe Kolleg_innen, wir möchten Sie herzlich zur folgenden Veranstaltung der „Phänomenologischen Forschungen“ einladen: *David W. Johnson (Boston)* *»Intersubjective Phenomenality: Kimura, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt«* VORTRAG: Mi, 26.06.2024, 18.30-20.00 Uhr, Hörsaal 3A, Institut für Philosophie, Universitätsstraße 7, A-1010 Wien Organisation: Michael Staudigl, Gerhard Unterthurner in Zusammenarbeit mit Bianca Boteva-Richter und Graham Parkes https://phaenomenologie.univie.ac.at/forschung/vorlesungsreihe-phaenomenolo… Mit besten Grüßen, Michael Staudigl, Gerhard Unterthurner

3 months, 4 weeks

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IVC Talk: Aleksandra Knežević (IVC Fellow) on "A framework for the feminist anthropology of science", June 27, 4.45 pm

by Zarah Weiss

Dear all, our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Aleksandra Knežević (IVC Fellow), who will give a talk on June 27, 4.45-6.15 pm. All are welcome! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM TALK: ALEKSANDRA KNEŽEVIĆ A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE Philosophy of Science Colloquium The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows. Date: 27/06/2024 Time: 16h45 Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 3F ABSTRACT: In this talk, I will unpack different facets of the question of what it means to do anthropology of science as a feminist. In the first part, I will examine the tradition of feminist philosophers of science discussing the possibility of feminist science. Then, I will discuss what a critical scientific perspective_ _entails in anthropology. Finally, I will integrate these two bodies of knowledge to explore what a feminist anthropology of science could mean in terms of its scientific practice. In the second part, I will focus on a related issue, which I call _the problem of normativity_ - the claim that science loses its crucial feature, objectivity, when influenced by feminism (or any other worldview). Despite well-established knowledge in feminist philosophy of science and 'values in science' discussions, which offer resolutions to this problem, I contend that confusion persists about what a critical perspective, such as a feminist one, implies for scientific reasoning and research aims. I will argue that the problem of normativity involves two aspects, which are often confused: first, whether values play a role in the context of justification, and second, whether a critical social scientist, in order to be critical, must go beyond description. I will address both issues by relying on mainstream claims from contemporary philosophy of science and will draw conclusions from this discussion for theorizing a feminist anthropology of science.

3 months, 4 weeks

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Call für Papers SWIP Symposium 2024

by Institut für Philosophie

Call für Papers SWIP Symposium 2024 Termin: Freitag/Samstag 15./16.November 2024 Ort: Wird bekannt gegeben (noch nicht sicher) Tagungssprachen: Deutsch und Englisch Tagungsthema: Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft neu gestalten – Herausforderungen für Philosophie in Theorie und Praxis Mit herzlichen Grüßen Brigitte Buchhammer

4 months

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P.Hahne (U. Vienna) "‘Trust the Machine?’: Conceptualising Trust in the Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence" & D.Boll (VU Amsterdam) "Taking Responsibility: With or Without You?" - WIP Series - 28.06-5pm (3A NiG)

by VDS Philosophy

** *Dear Colleagues,* * This is an email to invite you to the next presentations in the WIP series. The meeting will take place in lecture hall 3A (NIG, Universitätsstraße 7, 3rd floor) at 17:00 and will last up to 18:30. Pia-Zoe Hahne (University of Vienna): "‘Trust the Machine?’: Conceptualising Trust in the Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence" To accept a new technology, we first need to trust it. With AI, there is not just one specific kind of trust that we put in the system; instead, it is a “multidimensional construct, including trust in functionality, trust in reliability, and trust in data protection” (Wang, Lin & Shao, 2022, p. 340). However, trust in AI is often only conceptualised as an epistemic trust (Alvaro, 2023; Ryan, 2020). These approaches to study conceptual disruptions often remain abstract and disregard the involvement of stakeholders. This is where a new approach in engaging with conceptual disruptions comes in. Conceptual engineering is an emerging approach in philosophy of technology. It stresses the connection between empirical research and conceptual analysis (Löhr, 2023). Conceptual misalignment is relevant for AI as it describes a scenario in which concepts seem applicable while hiding “an underlying value misalignment” (Marchiori & Scharp, 2024, p. 2), resulting in ethical problems. Trust is an ideal concept for conceptual engineering as it forms the basis for other concepts and disruptions therefore have farreaching consequences. Löhr (2023) and Marchiori & Sharp (2024) specifically points out that studying these disruptions necessitates empirical data, demonstrating a new turn in engaging with conceptual disruptions. The intense disruptions influenced by AI present new challenges by moving away from a purely epistemic view on trust in technology as well as the far-reaching consequences on trust between people and trust in institutions. I present a new approach to study conceptual disruptions by moving beyond abstract conceptual analysis and into practical uses of concepts and empirical data through conceptual engineering. Dominik Boll (VU University Amsterdam) "Taking Responsibility: With or Without You?" My topic in this talk is talking responsibility and its place in our responsibility practices. The literature on responsibility has blossomed and turned to ever finer specialisation in the last decades, and yet the primary focus often remains on _ holding responsible_. Philosophers have increasingly turned to theorising our responsibility _practices_—how blaming and praising are _socialised_ phenomena, how holding responsible is something we _do _between each other beyond blame as a mental state—but there is still much focus on what the blamer does or is licenced to do. Few theorists focus on the perspective on the other side of responsibility interactions. While there are large literatures on guilt, apologies, or making amends, writers rarely take the general first-personal perspective of the party responding to their own infraction, investigating what it is for the agent to react to what they have done, what they are required to do to deal with it, and what precisely their response aims at. This presents an activity distinct from holding oneself responsible (Bero 2020). Indeed, the need to respond to our actions and their significance is an omnipresent aspect of our moral lives. We hold others responsible for what they do, and we take responsibility for what we do. This is not, however, how taking responsibility is currently theorised. Departing from Wolf (2001), philosophers have proposed different accounts of taking responsibility (Enoch 2012; Sliwa 2024; Mason 2019). They differ in their assumptions and goals but theorise something similar—how we react to (some of) our own morally consequential actions such as to accommodate its fallout for others. Notably, however, taking responsibility is captured as something entirely internal to the wrongdoer and not as an interpersonal practice parallel to holding responsible. In this paper, I theorise this interpersonal phenomenon. I first explicate two common threads in the literature on taking responsibility. Taking responsibility is theorised as something which the agent can do all by themselves, yet taking responsibility is supposed to be essentially interpersonal. I argue that this presents a tension and leaves a lacuna to theorise a broader account of taking responsibility. I then advance two arguments to show that such an account is needed for making sense of the full extent of our responsibility practices. Lastly, I provide the contours of such an account as an activity which achieves certain aims between its parties. This embeds taking responsibility in the broader web of our responsibility practices and resolves the tension. If my action has a morally significant impact on you, I can only take responsibility with you, not without you. You can write to wip.philosophie(a)univie.ac.at if you have any questions or would like to present for the Work-in-Progress series. Best wishes and we hope to see many of you there! The Organizing Team Chiara Dankl, Martin Niederl, Yi-Jie Xia, Adrian Fleisch, Mark Basafa, Sophie Veigl, Raphael Aybar, Nianzu Tu *

4 months

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AK-Wissenschaftspreis 2025

by Institut für Philosophie

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren! Die *Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich* schreibt *2025* zum*42. Mal *den *AK-Wissenschaftspreis österreichweit* aus! *Für junge Forscher:innen/Studierende werden erstmals zwei Wissenschaftspreise vergeben: * *Preis-Kategorie A: *Dissertationen und wissenschaftliche Artikel (*Preisgeld bis zu 3.000.- Euro*):**Dissertationen und wissenschaftliche Artikel | Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich <https://ooe.arbeiterkammer.at/beratung/bildung/bildungsfoerderungen/akwisse…>** *Preis-Kategorie B: *Master-/Diplomarbeiten zum Themenschwerpunkt „Künstliche Intelligenz“**(*Förderung bis zu 1.000.-, Veröffentlichung der Master-/Diplomarbeit*):**AK-Wissenschaftspreis 2025 | Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich <https://ooe.arbeiterkammer.at/beratung/bildung/bildungsfoerderungen/akwisse…>** ** *Wir würden uns freuen, wenn Sie unsere Ausschreibungen verbreiten könnten – Danke!!* Freundliche Grüße *Mag. Markus Unterthurner* Abteilung Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Gesellschaftspolitik Koordination Wissenschaftspreis <https://ooe.arbeiterkammer.at/wissenschaftspreis> Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Oberösterreich Volksgartenstraße 40, 4020 Linz TEL +43 (0)50 6906-2447 FAX +43 (0)50 6906-62447 E-MAIL unterthurner.m(a)akooe.at <mailto:unterthurner.m@akooe.at> E.MAIL wissenschaftspreis(a)akooe.at <mailto:wissenschaftspreis@akooe.at> WEBSITE ooo.arbeiterkammer.at *Mitglieder der AK Oberösterreich genießen viele Vorteile und Vergünstigungen. * *Der Schlüssel zur gesamten AK-Vorteilswelt ist die AK-Leistungskarte. * *Als App am Smartphone immer dabei! Alle Infos hier <https://ooe.arbeiterkammer.at/service/apps/AK_Leistungskarte_digital.html>.*

4 months

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Phänomenologische Forschungen – 20./21. Juni 2024 – Thomas Fuchs: Verteidigung des Menschen. Plädoyer für einen verkörperten Humanismus (Vortrag und Workshop)

by Institut für Philosophie

Phänomenologische Forschungen – 20./21. Juni 2024 – Thomas Fuchs: Verteidigung des Menschen. Plädoyer für einen verkörperten Humanismus (Vortrag und Workshop) Liebe Kolleg_innen, wir möchten Sie herzlich zur nächsten Veranstaltung der Vortragsreihe „Phänomenologische Forschungen“ einladen: 20./21.06.2024 Thomas Fuchs (Universität Heidelberg) "Verteidigung des Menschen. Plädoyer für einen verkörperten Humanismus" VORTRAG: Do., 20.06.2024, 18.30–20.00 Uhr, Hörsaal 3D, Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße 7, A-1010 Wien WORKSHOP: Fr., 21.06.2024, 09.00–12.00 Uhr, Hörsaal 2H, Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße 7, A-1010 Wien Für die Texte des Workshops - Mail an: gerhard.unterthurner(a)univie.ac.at Organisation: Michael Staudigl, Gerhard Unterthurner in Zusammenarbeit mit Florian Schmidsberger https://phaenomenologie.univie.ac.at/forschung/vorlesungsreihe-phaenomenolo… <https://phaenomenologie.univie.ac.at/forschung/vorlesungsreihe-phaenomenolo…> In Kooperation mit Gruppe Phänomenologie Mit besten Grüßen, Michael Staudigl, Gerhard Unterthurner

4 months

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Philosophie und Ethik in Schule und Gesellschaft: Schule und Universität zusammendenken

by Dilek Divan

Liebe Interessierte, dear all, ich lade Sie herzlich ein zur Teilnahme an dem unten stehenden Workshop / I cordially invite you to participate in the workshop described below, der ersten Veranstaltung in der Reihe / the first event in the series: Philosophie und Ethik in Schule und Gesellschaft: Schule und Universität zusammendenken Herzliche Grüße / best regards Arne Moritz Professur für Ethik in Schule und Gesellschaft Workshop Mündliche Leistungsbewertungen kompetenzorientiert gestalten im Ethik- und Philosophieunterricht Workshop am Freitag 21.6.2024, 15-16.30 Uhr (HS 3B, R.315, Neues Institutsgebäude (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, 3. Stock) und am Freitag 27.9.2024, 15-18:15 Uhr (Ort wird noch bekannt gegeben) Der Workshop richtet sich an alle Interessierten (Lehrkräfte, Studierende, weitere Öffentlichkeit), die sich zum Thema mündliche Leistungsbewertung in den Fächern Ethik/Philosophie (etwa im Zusammenhang der Matura-Prüfung) fachlich austauschen und persönlich vernetzen möchten. Beim ersten Termin im Juni wird es einen kurzen inhaltlichen Input aus fachdidaktischer Perspektive geben, in dem vor allem die Anforderung "Kompetenzorientierung" in zwei Weisen übersetzt und erläutert werden soll: a) hinsichtlich konzeptioneller Anforderungen und b) hinsichtlich praktischer Gestaltungen von mündlichen Leistungsbewertungssituationen im Ethik- und Philosophieunterricht. Im gemeinsamen Gespräch sollen von dort aus Interessenschwerpunkte und Herausforderungen identifiziert werden, die beim Termin im September weiter bearbeitet werden könnten. Unterschiedliche Formate sind denkbar, z.B. das Gespräch über fachdidaktische Vorschläge zum Thema Leistungsbewertung, die im Zeitraum zwischen Juni und September von den Teilnehmenden gelesen werden - und/oder der Austausch über die Herausforderungen und Möglichkeiten konkreter Aufgabenerstellungen, ausgehend von vorgegebenen Materialien, usw. Eine Anmeldung ist nicht erforderlich. Die Teilnahme am Termin im Juni verpflichtet nicht zur Teilnahme im September. The workshop (which is held in German) is aimed at all interested persons (teachers, students, other people from the public) who would like to exchange ideas on the topic of oral assessment in the school subjects of ethics/philosophy (e.g. in connection with the Matura examination) and who would like to network personally. At the first meeting in June, there will be a brief input from a didactical perspective, in which the requirement of "competence orientation" will be interpreted and explained in two ways: a) with regard to conceptual requirements and b) with regard to the practical design of oral assessment situations in ethics and philosophy education. From there, key points of interest and the relevant challenges are to be identified in a joint discussion, which could be worked on further at the meeting in September. Different formats are available, e.g. a discussion on didactical texts on the subject of assessment, which participants will read in the period between June and September - and/or an exchange on the challenges and opportunities of designing actual assessment exercises based on given materials, etc. Registration is not required. Participation in the June event does not require to participate in September. -- Univ.-Prof. Dr. Arne Moritz Professur für Ethik in Schule und Gesellschaft Fakultät für Philosophie und Bildungswissenschaft Institut für Philosophie/Zentrum für Lehrer*innenbildung Universität Wien https://homepage.univie.ac.at/arne.holger.moritz/ Neues Institutsgebäude (NIG) Universitätsstraße 7 Stiege I, Gang A, R. 312 1010 Wien

4 months

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Khôra Colloquium: , 20.06. 2024, 18:30, HS 2H, NIG

by Sebastian Krach

Sehr geehrte Kolleg:innen, ich möchte Sie im Namen von Khôra herzlich zum nächsten Colloquium einladen. Termin: 20.06.2024, 18:30 - 20:00, Hörsaal 2H, Neues Institutsgebäude (NIG) Thema: Kritik der Philosophie – Philosophie der Kritik. Marx, Engels und die deutsche Ideologie mit einem Input von Hannah Zipser Für einen Auszug aus Die deutsche Ideologie (S.13-36) schreiben Sie mir bitte persönlich, ich sende diesen gerne auf Anfrage zu. Weitere Informationen sowie eine Mailingliste finden Sie auf unserer Homepage. https://www.khora.philo.at/ Danach ist im Café Gagarin reserviert, wo wir den Abend gemeinsam ausklingen lassen. Wir freuen uns auf euch! Liebe Grüße Sebastian Krach

4 months

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IVC Talk: Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona (IVC Fellow) on "Sundholm's Semantics: Logical Atavism and the Nature of Proofs", June 20, 4.45 pm

by Zarah Weiss

Dear all, our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona (IVC Fellow), who will give a talk on June 20, 4.45-6.15 pm. All are welcome! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Philosophy of Science Colloquium TALK: Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona SUNDHOLM'S SEMANTICS: LOGICAL ATAVISM AND THE NATURE OF PROOFS Philosophy of Science Colloquium The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows. Date: 20/06/2024 Time: 16h45 Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 3F ABSTRACT: I aim at providing an overview of some of Sundholm's observations on the philosophy and history of logic, which I overall refer to as _Sundholm's semantics_. In the reconstruction I propose, the latter is based on two main tenets, namely, that we had better jettison the object-language/meta-language distinction, and that the careful meaning-explanation which formalisms must come with render the axioms and rules of inference evident. The first tenet goes hand in hand with the detection of what Sundholm call the _Bolzano reductions_, namely, two methodological tenets according to which, first, correctness of assertions is reduced to propositional truth and, second, inferential validity is reduced to logical consequence. In Sundholm's opinion, these Bolzano reductions hide crucial epistemic and pragmatic aspects of logic, when compared to what is the case in "atavistic" approaches like Frege's, where formalisms are indeed understood as meaningful languages. Thus, Sundholm's semantics does not consist in a meta-linguistic attribution of meaning to uninterpreted sets of strings, but in an issuing of the intended meaning of contentual formalism, including semantic values for derivations. The latter are dealt with by Sundholm through a distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, which Sundholm himself had put stressed in the context of his early discussion of BHK-semantics. When cast as a constructive reading of the so-called truth-maker principle, via a Martin-Löfian rendering of assertions as existence of proof(-object)s for given propositions, the proof-object/proof-act distinction leads to a fresh semantic account of Gentzen's 1932 and 1936 versions of Natural Deduction, as well as to doubts regarding their often asserted meta-theoretical equivalence.

4 months

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