Dear all, our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Andreas Frenzel, who will give a talk on October 17, 4.45-6.15 pm. All are welcome! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Philosophy of Science Colloquium TALK: Andreas Frenzel Conceptual Pluralism and Formal Philosophy Philosophy of Science Colloquium The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows. Date: 17/10/2024 Time: 16h45 Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 2G Abstract: In this talk, I will explain the significance of conceptual pluralism for formal philosophy, arguing that this position can serve as a desirable paradigm. I will first show that conceptual pluralism is a reasonable position to take, given that it is often underdetermined which formalization best captures an ordinary concept. Afterwards, I will argue that it is important for formal philosophy to block out the intuitions associated with ordinary concepts. One of the hallmarks of formal philosophy is the formalization of philosophical concepts. Conceptual pluralism is the view that there are often multiple equally admissible formalizations of a concept. If this is the case, one needs to use further criteria, perhaps based on practical considerations, to determine which formalization to choose. What counts as the "best" formalization has to be spelled out in terms of normative requirements that a formalization has to meet. These depend on the particular goals that are pursued and the purpose for which the concept in question is intended. Formalizations thus have to be assessed based on their properties which make them more or less useful. Some ordinary concepts exhibit vagueness or open texture, which adds to the difficulty of giving a clear and precise definition for them. Formalizations often possess a degree of precision that is simply not present in ordinary concepts, which is why none of the formalizations are uniquely correct. They each differ from the ordinary concept in some way, capturing different aspects of it. For this reason, there are often multiple admissible formalizations. Issues like open texture arise from the mismatch between our intuitive expectation of how a formalization will capture an ordinary concept and the way that a formalization actually captures it. If the intuitive expectation is "blocked out", so to speak, it can be seen that the formal concept in itself is unproblematic and useful, even if it does not exactly capture the ordinary concept. For this reason, I will argue that it is preferable for formal philosophy to use stipulative rather than descriptive definitions. A stipulative definition does not aim to capture some preexisting concept accurately. Instead, the conditions of application that it contains are themselves definitive for how the concept ought to be understood and used.