March 2024 - Iris - Philosophy bulletin board

IVC Talk: Adrien Champougny on "Reverse Mathematics: Why Should the Philosopher Care About It?", April 4, 4.45 pm

by Zarah Weiss

Dear all, next week, there will be a little Easter break. Please note that our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Adrien Champougny (IVC Fellow), who will give a talk on April 4, 4.45-6.15 pm. All are welcome! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Philosophy of Science Colloquium TALK: Adrien Champougny Reverse Mathematics: Why Should the Philosopher Care About It? Philosophy of Science Colloquium The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows. Date: 04/04/2024 Time: 16h45 Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 3F Abstract: Reverse mathematics is a sub-field of mathematical logic. It is used to, a certain theorem t being given, be able to identify exactly what is needed to prove t. The goal of this talk is to provide a brief introduction to reverse mathematics and to give a few insights on why it is an interesting subject from a philosophical point of view. I will show how the founding fathers of reverse mathematics (that is Harvey Friedeman and Steven Simpson) offered a first philosophical reading of their work that was mainly ontological in character: according to their view, the goal of reverse mathematics is to identify “[…] which set existence axioms are needed to prove the known theorems of mathematics” [Simpson,2009]. I will then present another way to see the philosophical interest of reverse mathematics that is more focused on the epistemological side. This reading rests on a simple idea: all other things being equal, one has a deeper epistemological control over a constructive proof than over an unconstructive one (I will try to make this concept precise in the course of the presentation). According to this reading, reverse mathematics can be seen as a way to evaluate what kind of knowledge we can hope to acquire concerning a particular mathematical theorem. Finally, assuming that time permits, I will close my presentation by mentioning a new field of research started by Benedict Eastaugh and Walter Dean: reverse philosophy. The idea in this field is to find an argument in philosophy that somehow rests on a mathematical theorem and to show that this mathematical theorem necessitates some non-trivial mathematical resources to be proven.

1 month, 3 weeks

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(deadline 22. March) CFA: Workshop on Truth, Definability and Quantification into Sentence Position

by Lena Golker

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS Workshop on Truth, Definability and Quantification into Sentence Position 27 and 28 September 2024, University of Vienna Jointly organised by Max Kölbel, Julio de Rizzo and Benjamin Schnieder -------- Can truth be defined? Frege argued that it couldn't. Ramsey argued that defining it would be easy if only we had an analysis of judgement. Today Horwich claims that truth cannot be defined explicitly because doing so would require quantification into sentence position and such quantification is not coherent. Instead he proposes a "minimal theory" of truth, which comprises all the unproblematic instances of the equivalence schema. Künne, by contrast, argues that quantification into sentence position is coherent and may actually be part of some natural languages. Künne uses such quantification to define truth explicitly: ∀x (x is true iff ∃p ((x is the proposition that p) & p)). Or in English: a representation (belief, assertion etc) is true just if things are as it represents them as being. Künne claims also to find this definition in Frank Ramsey's posthumous work, which, as an exegetical claim, is not uncontroversial. Is truth definable? Is propositional quantification coherent? Do natural languages involve propositional quantification, and in what sense? What do the answers to these questions mean for philosophical attempts to define or explain truth? Is truth redundant if explicitly definable? Not redundant if not explicitly definable? We are interested in these and related questions (broadly conceived). -------- Confirmed speakers are: Peter Fritz (Australian Catholic University) Paul Horwich (New York University) Wolfgang Künne (University of Hamburg) Poppy Mankowitz (University of Bristol) Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto) -------- We invite submissions of extended abstracts (1000 words max.) for up to 3 further talks. Please send your anonymized abstracts by 22 March 2024 to truthwien(a)gmail.com. Selected speakers will be notified by mid April. We will cover accommodation of selected speakers (and on application offer them a travel subsidy of up to 400 Euros). This workshop is supported by the FWF Cluster of Excellence project "Knowledge in Crisis", the FWF project "Truth is Grounded in Facts" and the University of Vienna.

1 month, 3 weeks

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Colloquium: "The Life of the Mind in the History of Philosophy" (April 4-5, University of Notre Dame | Online & In Person Attendance)

by Institut für Philosophie

Dear colleagues, The History of Philosophy Forum at the University of Notre Dame (USA) is hosting its annual Spring Colloquium on April 4-5, 2024. Registration is open to attend the colloquium online or in person on Notre Dame's campus (registration link: https://forms.gle/Pz9PQG8sjxfYRn276). This year's theme is *"The Life of the Mind in the History of Philosophy."* Colloquium participants consider the following issues as they have appeared across the history of philosophy: Could we understand thinking as an activity of life, rather than as an abstract logical operation? How could we make sense of the (human) mind as something living, or as fundamentally instantiated by living beings? How can we model the characteristic dynamics of mental development, self-formation, and personal growth? Is the life of the mind as real as or even more real than the life of organisms? This colloquium draws together various models of the ‘life of the mind’ from across the history of philosophy. The following scholars are scheduled to present: * Anne Clausen, University of Göttingen * Alix Cohen, University of Notre Dame * Gerad Gentry, Johannes-Gutenberg University Mainz * Peter John Hartman, Loyola University Chicago * Julia Jorati, University of Massachusetts Amherst * Jari Kaukua, University of Jyväskylä * Katharina Kraus, Johns Hopkins University * Hannah Laurens, University of Oxford * Scott MacDonald, Cornell University * Wiebke Marie Stock, University of Notre Dame * Mark Textor, King’s College London More details about the colloquium, including the schedule of presentations, can be found on the poster and program attached below, as well as on the colloquium webpage (https://historyofphilosophy.nd.edu/colloquium/2024-the-life-of-the-mind-in-… <https://historyofphilosophy.nd.edu/colloquium/2024-the-life-of-the-mind-in-…>). Registrants who opt to attend online will receive a zoom link via email in advance of the colloquium. Registrants attending in person are invited to join for breakfast and lunch during the colloquium proceedings. Should any questions arise, please reach out to historyofphilosophy(a)nd.edu. With warm regards, Katharina Kraus, Johns Hopkins University Stephen Ogden, University of Notre Dame Therese Cory, University of Notre Dame --------------------------------------------------------------------- History of Philosophy Forum University of Notre Dame https://historyofphilosophy.nd.edu historyofphilosophy(a)nd.edu (574) 631-3610 (direct line) (574) 631-0588 (fax) 430 Geddes Hall Notre Dame, IN 46556

1 month, 3 weeks

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Reminder: APSE Talk Mirjam Faissner - "Epistemic Oppression and Trans Healthcare"

by Flora Löffelmann

Dear all, this is a reminder to come to the next talk organized by APSE – Applied Philosophy of Science and Epistemology. Mirjam Faissner (Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin) will give a talk titled "Epistemic Oppression and Trans Healthcare". We are very excited about her talk! Where and When: 21.3.2024, 15:00, HS 3A (NIG). Abstract: To understand and communicate our social experiences, we rely on epistemic resources, such as words, concepts, metaphors, or social meanings. Yet, which epistemic resources are socially available depends on power structures. The concept of epistemic oppression, as developed by Kristie Dotson, is helpful in understanding how power structures enable and constrain epistemic agency, i. e. our ability to use, develop and adapt our shared epistemic resources. In this talk, I argue that institutional epistemologies in healthcare sustain the epistemic oppression of trans people. More specifically, I suggest that dominant narratives on transition and detransition available in healthcare result in hermeneutical injustice and smothering, two types of epistemic injustice that uphold epistemic oppression. I discuss consequences of the epistemic oppression of trans people for trans healthcare. Bio: Mirjam Faissner is a medical ethicist working at the Institute of the History of Medicine and Ethics in Medicine at Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin. Trained as a medical doctor and a philosopher, she works on questions of structural and epistemic injustice in healthcare, combining philosophical and empirical research. Looking forward to seeing you at the talk! Please also let me know if you would like to join for dinner afterwards :) All the best, Flora Löffelmann on behalf of APSE -- Flora Löffelmann, MA MA University assistant & doctoral candidate Department of Philosophy at University of Vienna Pronouns: they/them (for more info see: https://www.mypronouns.org/what-and-why/) Happy about a gender neutral "hello"!

1 month, 3 weeks

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"Katharsis: On the Platonic Adaptation of an Orphic Idea" by Hermann Crüwell - WIP Series - Thursday 21.03.24, Room 3A, NiG

by VDS Philosophy

*WIP Series 21.03.2024 - Thursday, HS 3A, NiG - "Katharsis: On the Platonic Adaptation of an Orphic Idea" by Hermann Crüwell* Dear all, This is an email to inform you that the next presentation in the Work-In-Progress series will be given by Hermann Crüwell (Ernst-Mach Postdoc, University of Vienna; Ph.D., University of Oxford)) this coming Thursday. The presentation is entitled "Katharsis: On the Platonic Adaptation of an Orphic Idea" Abstract: At the time when Plato wrote his dialogues, many people sought meaning and salvation in Orphic mystery cults. In short, Orphism taught that the soul was once in a state of primordial blessedness in the company of the gods. Because of an original sin, it fell away from this state and is now trapped in circles of reincarnation in human bodies. Only initiation into the Orphic mysteries and purification from its current impure condition can help the practitioner to be released from this circle, restore itself in its original condition and attain eternal bliss in the company of the gods once again. Plato was critical of these cults, which often demanded fees in exchange for salvation by purifying rituals and initiation into the mysteries (cf. Republic 364b–c). At the same time, he took on central concepts and narratives from the Orphics to give expression to his own philosophical outlook on the soul, its fate, and its quest for self-perfection. Focusing on the Phaedo and its concept of katharsis (purification), I explore how Plato transforms an Orphic idea to conceptualize the soul's cognitive progress towards wisdom and virtue of character by means of philosophy. The meeting will take place in lecture hall 3A (NIG, Universitätsstraße 7, 3rd floor) at 17:15 and will last up to 18:45. All are invited to join us for dinner or drinks afterward. If possible, please let us know in advance by email. You can write towip.philosophie(a)univie.ac.atif you have any questions or would like to present for the Work-in-Progress series in the SoSe24. Calendar and event information can be found at:https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/phd-program/doctoral-training/wip-series/ Best wishes and we hope to see many of you there! The Organizing Team (Chiara Dankl, Martin Niederl, Yi-Jie Xia, Adrian Fleisch, Mark Basafa, Sophie Veigl, Nianzu Tu, Raphael Aybar)

1 month, 3 weeks

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CFP on Identity, Virtue and Human-AI Interaction

by Institut für Philosophie

Esteemed Colleagues, We would like to invite you to participate in our conference focusing on the relationship between identity and virtue in the context of human-AI interaction which will take place on the 30^th and 31^st of May this year in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The conference theme encompasses three main areas of inquiry: 1. The interplay between identity and virtue(s) in human behavior. 2. The significance of virtues in shaping human-AI interactions, online environments and their consequences for identity. 3. Exploring the plausibility of attributing virtue and identity to AI-based systems or AI-powered robots. Our aim will be to elucidate how epistemic identity, encompassing fundamental beliefs, cognitive processes, and epistemic standards, intertwines with virtuousness, religious belief(s) and associated virtues such as humility, largely in connection with newly developed AI tools. In this we will be examining the connections between virtue epistemology, AI ethics, and religious studies. Papers are also invited to explore topics such as the evolution of human epistemic identities in the context of AI interactions, the possibility of communication and evolution of religious beliefs within human-AI interactions, the discernibility of epistemic identity in AI systems and its implications, and the attribution of virtues or vices to AI entities and their potential impact on epistemic harm or injustice. We welcome submissions from diverse fields, including philosophy, bioethics, theology, computer science, law, and educational sciences. The conference aims to facilitate interdisciplinary discussions and welcomes contributions that cut across disciplinary boundaries. We will be accepting submissions at this email address (info(a)identity.ethics-ai.eu) until the 29^th of March. Please find attached more detailed information regarding submission guidelines and deadlines. We invite you to participate in this exploration of identity, virtue, and the evolving dynamics of human-AI interaction. Your contributions are integral to advancing our understanding of these complex themes. Best regards, Matej Kapus Epistemic Identity and Epistemic Virtue Research Project in collaboration with Faculty of Theology Ljubljana

1 month, 4 weeks

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IVC Talk: Marta Sznajder on "Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum's Early Works: Between Warsaw and Cambridge", March 21, 4.45 pm

by Zarah Weiss

Dear all, our next speaker in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium organized by the Institute Vienna Circle is Marta Sznajder (Institute Vienna Circle), who will give a talk on March 21, 4.45-6.15 pm. All are welcome! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM TALK: MARTA SZNAJDER Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum's Early Works: Between Warsaw and Cambridge Philosophy of Science Colloquium The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows. Date: 21/03/2024 Time: 16h45 Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 3F ABSTRACT: In 1931, Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum proposed a proto-decision-theoretic answer to the value of evidence problem, originally posed by C. D. Broad and solved by I. J. Good in the context of Savage's decision theory. As an influence on her paper she credited Frank Ramsey, whose then unpublished "Truth and Probability" (Ramsey 1926) she had read shortly after Ramsey's death in 1930. But Hosiasson also insisted that she had "previously thought independently on similar lines" (Hosiasson 1931, ft. 15). This raises two questions. First, what is it exactly that Hosiasson-Lindenbaum took herself to be in agreement on with Ramsey, or what part of her approach has been inspired by his paper? And second: what _did_ she "previously [think] independently"? In the paper, I answer the two questions, drawing on Hosiasson-Lindenbaum's work published before her contact with Ramsey's work, as well as shortly after (and which has not received any attention to date). I propose a more minimal answer to the first of the above questions, arguing that we should not read Hosiasson as taking up Ramsey's theory of epistemic probability wholesale. While Hosiasson did use the concept of "mathematical expectation", or expected utility, as a model for how people use probability to inform some of their decisions, she does not connect this to any general view on what probabilities are overall. This reading is then supported by a detailed analysis of Hosiasson's early works. While Hosiasson's (probably) first philosophical work--her doctoral dissertation from 1926--had been lost, fragments of it were published in two papers (Hosiasson 1928, 1934). The second of those papers was published with a large delay and contains a lot of material that was added after 1931/2. This makes it particularly interesting in the context of this study, since those dates are precisely the cut-off point for Hosiasson's contact with Ramsey's work.

1 month, 4 weeks

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CfA: Passau Summer School for Applied Ethics (31.3.2024)

by Institut für Philosophie

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, vom 2.-6. September 2024 findet die erste *internationale und interdisziplinäre Passau Summer School for Applied Ethics (PASSAE)* an der Universität Passau statt. Die erste PASSAE 2024 wird die Philosophie Immanuel Kants auf drei Themenfelder hin befragen, die aktuell ethische Fragen aufwerfen: Digitalisierung, Nachhaltigkeit und die Zukunft Europas. Durch Fachvorträge von internationalen Expert:innen und Diskussionen in Arbeitsgruppen werden wir der Frage nachgehen, ob und was Kants Philosophie zu diesen gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen beitragen kann. Wissenschaftskommunikation und ein kulturelles Rahmenprogramm sind auch Teil des Events. PASSAE richtet sich an *Studierende aller Disziplinen und Universitäten* und insbesondere an Studierende der Philosophie, Geschichte, Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, European Studies, Informatik und Sustainability Studies. Die Bewerbung ist noch bis *31.3.2024* unter https://passae.uni-passau.de <https://passae.uni-passau.de> möglich. Die Veranstaltungssprache ist Englisch. Die Eigenbeteiligung beträgt 50€ und umfasst die Verpflegung während der Veranstaltung sowie einen Teil des Rahmenprogramms. Wir würden uns freuen, zahlreiche Studierende aus Österreich in Passau zu begrüßen! Weitere Informationen finden Sie auf der Website https://passae.uni-passau.de <https://passae.uni-passau.de>. Für Rückfragen sind wir unter passae(a)uni-passau.de <mailto:passae@uni-passau.de> erreichbar. Herzliche Grüße Call for Applications: PASSAE 2024 *Die Bewerbungsphase für die erste Passau Summer School for Applied Ethics hat begonnen! Bis 31.3.2024 können sich interessierte Studierende aller Fächer und Universitäten bewerben.* Die erste PASSAE steht unter dem Titel *#Kant: Digitalization – Europe – Sustainability* und wird die Philosophie Immanuel Kants auf drei Themenfelder hin befragen, die aktuell und zukünftig ethische Fragen aufwerfen: Digitalisierung, Nachhaltigkeit und die Zukunft Europas. Durch Fachvorträge und Diskussionen mit internationalen Expert:innen sowie in interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppen werden die Teilnehmenden der Frage nachgehen, ob und was Kants Philosophie zu diesen gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen beitragen kann. PASSAE 2024 findet vom 02.-06.09.2024 an der Universität Passau statt. Bis 31.3.2024 können sich interessierte Studierende aller Fächer und Universitäten bewerben. PASSAE-Website: https://passae.uni-passau.de <https://passae.uni-passau.de> Hier geht es zur Bewerbung <https://passae.uni-passau.de/application-form/>! Call for Applications: PASSAE 2024 *The application for the first Passau Summer School for Applied Ethics is now open! Students from all disciplines and universities can apply until 31.3.2024.* The first PASSAE, *#Kant: Digitalization – Europe – Sustainability*, will explore Immanuel Kant’s philosophy on three topics that raise current and future ethical questions: Digitalization, Sustainability and the Future of Europe. Through lectures and discussions with international experts as well as in interdisciplinary working groups, we will explore the question of whether and what Kant’s philosophy can contribute to these contemporary challenges. PASSAE 2024 takes place from 2. to 6. September 2024 at the University of Passau. Students from all disciplines and universities can apply until 31.3.2024. International students are particularly welcome. Website of the event: https://passae.uni-passau.de <https://passae.uni-passau.de> Apply here <https://passae.uni-passau.de/application-form/>! -- Johanna Sinn Research Assistant Professorship of Applied Ethics Prof. Dr. Karoline Reinhardt University of Passau Germany johanna.sinn(a)uni-passau.de https://www.geku.uni-passau.de/en/angewandte-ethik <https://www.geku.uni-passau.de/en/angewandte-ethik> PASSAE – Passau Summer School for Applied Ethics #Kant: Digitalization – Europe – Sustaiinability 2.-6. September 2024 https://passae.uni-passau.de <https://passae.uni-passau.de/> passae(a)uni-passau.de <mailto:passae@uni-passau.de>

1 month, 4 weeks

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Register now: SOCRATES Workshop "Practices of Storytelling and Indigenous Epistemologies", 3 May 2024

by Institut für Philosophie

Dear colleagues, We cordially invite you to our SOCRATES Workshop on "Practices of Storytelling and Indigenous Epistemologies" - registration is now open! *PRACTICES OF STORYTELLING AND INDIGENOUS EPISTEMOLOGIES International Workshop Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University Hannover, Germany 3 May 2024* *Register now! (Deadline: 3 April 2024 23:59 CEST) <https://www.socrates.uni-hannover.de/en/news-events/upcoming-events/events-…>* Practices of storytelling are vital to the creation and transformation of Indigenous concepts and ideas, and vital to understanding and enabling Indigenous forms of philosophical inquiry. Oral narratives, weaving, carving, and other artforms such as, for instance, architecture, song, and dance both contain and enable philosophical inquiry. What is more, creative artforms remain sites of struggle, resistance, and reclaiming of Indigenous philosophies for many Indigenous communities around the world – holding space for traditional and contemporary ideas to be reimagined and renewed. In this workshop, we explore the role of storytelling (broadly understood) in Indigenous knowledge. We also ask what the academic discipline of philosophy (and the philosophers therein) might gain from better understanding these practices. To that end, we ask questions such as: What is the function of storytelling in Indigenous knowledge? Do practices of storytelling necessarily clash with other (more dominant) knowledge practices? What would it take to reconcile the deep differences between them fairly? What would it take for the academic discipline to include (and enable) diverse methods of inquiry (such as storytelling)? What limits, if any, are there to how non-indigenous philosophers use Indigenous knowledge-making practices such as stories in their work? And, what ethical and trust-based issues arise at the intersections of Indigenous storytelling and mainstream scientific practice? The workshop includes talks by invited speakers Inkeri Koskinen (University of Helsinki), Yolanda Lopez-Maldonado (Indigenous Science), David Ludwig (Wageningen University), Adriana Moreno Cely (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), and Krushil Watene (University of Auckland). There is no participation fee. If you have any questions, please contact the workshop organiser Dr. T.Y. Branch (branch(a)philos.uni-hannover.de). /SOCRATES: Social Credibility and Trustworthiness of Expert Knowledge and Science-Based Information <https://www.socrates.uni-hannover.de/en/> is a Centre for Advanced Studies funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It provides a forum for interdisciplinary exchange on scientific credibility and trust in science and is based at the Institute for Philosophy at Leibniz University Hannover./ Best regards, Leonie Wiemeyer -- Dr. Leonie Wiemeyer (sie/she) Koordinatorin | Coordinator Office days: Tuesdays and alternate Thursdays “SOCRATES – Social Credibility and Trustworthiness of Expert Knowledge and Science-Based Information” DFG-Kollegforschungsgruppe (KFG) 43, Centre for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences Institut für Philosophie Leibniz Universität Hannover Lange Laube 32 30159 Hannover Germany E-Mail:leonie.wiemeyer@philos.uni-hannover.de Mobil: +49 (0)160 92470508 Telefon: +49 (0)511 762-14541 Find us online athttp://socrates.uni-hannover.de!

1 month, 4 weeks

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Guest Lectures from The Centre for Ethics, Pardubice - 20.03.24 - 18:30-20:30 - HS 3A, NiG

by VD Philosophy

Dear all, We cordially invite you to join two talks on moral philosophy by scholars from The Centre for Ethics at University of Pardubice. 1) Silvia Caprioglio Panizza (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow): What's Your Moral Impossibility? Abstract: Our moral agency is typically defined by what we do, what we think, what we will. I argue that equally important is the ‘dark’ side of choice, thought, and imagination – specifically, what we do not take as a possibility. I call this domain ‘moral impossibility’. In this talk I show how moral impossibility (often silently) delimits and defines our option ranges, our moral character, and our sense of value. Putting these three consequences together, I suggest an application of moral impossibility to the explanation of deep disagreement, understood as situations when one party demands what is not just wrong, but morally impossible (here in the form of ‘unthinkability’) for the other, and vice versa. If we interpret deep disagreement this way, what changes? 2) Niklas Forsberg (Head of Research): Our(?) Concept of Food Abstract: One of the more difficult sentences of Cora Diamond’s seminal paper “Eating Meat, Eating People” is: “it is not 'morally wrong' to eat our pets; people who ate their pets would not have pets in the same sense of that term.” There are a number in ways in which this phrase may seem challenging. One is that it ties the sense of moral value to our concepts. If people ate their pets they would have a different concept of “pet,” and because of that conceptual difference, we would not be able to simply state that they are morally wrong. This marks out conceptual differences as playing a pivotal role in marking out moral differences. Deep moral disagreements are often rooted in conceptual divergencies. It may, however, now look like morality itself is losing its foundation. Change your concepts, and you get a new morality! In my talk, I will try to show why that is a distorted understanding of the kind of point that Diamond is making. So, I will try to show why it may actually be helpful to think about moral differences as conceptual differences. In order to see why the way of thinking that Diamond here illustrates is not a flat-out relativistic doctrine, one needs to, as Iris Murdoch (one of Diamond’s sources of philosophical inspiration) revise our concept of a concept, and perhaps also our conception of what it means to have a moral belief. There is, though, no simple route (that I can find) to clarity about these matters, so the first part of the talk will include placing a number of philosophical views and problems on the table (about moral beliefs and argumentation, human agency and responsibility, and features of the asymmetry that can be discerned between views that are reached by means of directed reasoning and views that are “merely” inherited. Snacks and drinks will be provided! Both talks will be in English. If you have any questions, please contact either Konstantin Deininger (konstantin.deininger(a)univie.ac.at) or Erich Linder (erich.linder(a)vetmeduni.ac.at). For more information about the Centre for Ethics see: https://centreforethics.upce.cz/en/ https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/events/details/news/guest-lectures-from-…

2 months

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Iris March 2024