25 Apr
2024
25 Apr
'24
11:24 a.m.
Dear Colleagues,
We are happy to invite you to the next session of the Work-In-Progress
series in a week, on Thursday 2nd May. There will be two presentations,
given by Mariia Fedorova and Zachary Daus. Detailed information is
below:
When & Where: Thursday, May 2, 17:15 - 18:45, Hörsaal 3A (NIG,
Universitätsstraße 7)
1st Presentation: Speaker: Mariia Fedorova.
Title: On Virtues and Vices of Imaginative Constraints
Abstract:
Several philosophers have recently argued that imagination can be
epistemically useful when it is properly constrained by reality.
Nevertheless, the nature of the so-called imaginative constraints has
remained a contentious matter. On the one hand, it is believed that
imagination is constrained by one’s beliefs about the world which are
readily accessible to introspection and available for voluntary control.
I refer to this view as the voluntary-imaginative-constraints view
(VIC). On the other hand, given the shared cognitive architecture of
perception and imagination, imaginative constraints are stipulated to
take the form of perceptual regularities, inaccessible to consciousness
and, by extension, out of voluntary control. Call this view the
architectural-imaginative-constraints view (AIC). Prima facie, VIC and
AIC are compatible. It seems plausible to suppose that imagination can
be constrained by one’s beliefs about the world as well as by perceptual
regularities. Under closer examination, however, the advocates of VIC
and AIC appear to talk about one and the same kind of imaginative
constraints - the imaginer’s background knowledge of her environment.
The key difference between VIC and AIC lies in the relationship they
take to obtain between the imaginer and her knowledge. This puts
pressure on the apparent compatibility of VIC and AIC and challenges us
to make a choice between treating the imaginer’s knowledge as (i)
consciously accessible and controlled or as (ii) inaccessible to
consciousness and out of voluntary control. If we favour (i),
imagination’s reliability is in jeopardy. If we favour (ii), its
epistemic value is compromised. Fortunately, a dual-system model of
imagination as proposed by Michael Stuart offers a way out of this
dilemma. Instead of distinguishing different types of imaginative
constraints, we can distinguish different ways of exercising
imagination, one of which is consciously accessible and controlled,
while the other is unconscious and automatic.
2nd Presentation: Speaker: Zachary Daus.
Title: Distribution, Recognition and the Politics
of Justice in Medical AI.
Abstract:
Advocates of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine suggest that one
of its greatest benefits is its ability to resolve issues in the
distribution of scarce medical resources. While there is real potential
for medical AI to alleviate medical resource scarcity and consequently
contribute to a more just distribution of medical resources, this would
come at a cost to justice as recognition. A biased clinical decision
support system (CDSS), for example, may result in more distributively
just outcomes by expanding access to medical care, but at a cost to the
mis-recognition of minorities and women. Should such a CDSS be tolerated
for its improvement in distribution at its cost to recognition?
Similarly a black box CDSS, for example, may arrive at decisions that
are incapable of meaningful explanations despite expanding access to
medical care. Must such systems incur the cost of being engineered for
explainability in order to ensure that they do not mis-recognize humans
qua rational agents? In light of these and similar issues, I argue that
one of the predominant theories of justice that guides the distribution
of medical resources—Norman Daniels's Rawls-inspired accountability for
reasonableness (AFR)—must be either supplemented or replaced by a theory
of justice as recognition, and consider the theories of recognition
developed by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth as potential candidates.
There are refreshments and snacks. And all are invited to join for
dinner or drinks afterward.
Please let us know (wip.philosophie(a)univie.ac.at) if you have any
questions or if you would like to present for the Work-in-Progress
series yourself. You can find calendar and event information
at: https://vd-philosophy.univie.ac.at/phd-program/doctoral-training/wip-series/.
Best wishes and we hope to see you there!
The organizing team