[PhilWeb] Re: Gewalt ist (k)eine Lösung?

Lieber Karl, zum Verhältnis abstrakter, mathematisierbarer Kategorien wie Zeit und Raum und empirischer Lebenwirklichkeit gab es in researchgate.net <http://researchgate.net/> eine Diskussion, zu der ich etwas beigetragen habe, ich zitiere im Folgenden. Marilyn Stendera ist eine in Australien lehrende Philosophin, die die deutsche Sprache beherrscht, daher ist ein hier wegen Überlänge nicht zitierter Teil meines Beitrages auf deutsch geschrieben. Hier der Beitrag, und hier der Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381613945_Some_comments_on-_Marily… <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381613945_Some_comments_on-_Marilyn_Stendera_2022_Heidegger_on_the_Calculability_of_Time> Heidelberg, June 9th, 2004 Thomas Fröhlich Comments on Marilyn Stendera (2022) Heidegger on the Calculability of Time Dear Marilyn, concerning your discussion in Marilyn Stendera (2022) Heidegger on the Calculability of Time, Australasian Philosophical Review, 6:3, 282-287, DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2023.2263983, I may contribute some ideas, based on Heidegger’s Identität und Differenz, Band 11 Gesamtausgabe, Vittorio Klostermann Frankfurt, 2006. Here, I first cite from the introducing chapter “Was ist das- die Philosophie?”. My main point focuses in the primordial, dynamically cohering homogeneous uniqueness and singularity of what can be identified with an attributed identity. This homogeneity (“ursprünglicher Einklang”) includes individually realized aspects of what can be observed in other singularities, to then become a trans-individual category, like the categories of time and space. In fact, both are aspects of individual agency, realizing underpinned trans-momentary potentials, to use further categories. The primordial unit is agency, hence, and its individual timing has aspects which may be shared with other individualities’ timing, allowing to mentally construe a categorically overarching abstract, general time, which is not real as a generality and as this generality, but only as individually embedded in the corresponding (“jeweiligen”) agencies. Time does not add as a separate entity to an as well abstract space, to combine to an empiric timespace only then. Instead, it is an individuality-based aspect able to transcend the individual by virtue of its shareable, that is, aspectual nature. In this transcendence, time, as well as individual being-at-a-place enacts an convergence potential, transcending the inside in favor of connecting and interacting with other insides, each seen as the corresponding inside’s outside. So, time has an inherent connectivity aspect, one bridging the gap and difference of being inside, and addressing an outside. I think I can find some arguments supporting this view in Heidegger’s work cited below. I may go on in German, citing Heidegger directly, which allows to better notice and listen to his alliterations like in “bestimmen, Stimmung, Stimme, Sprechen, entsprechen, durchsprechen, klingen, anklingen, Einklang, Weg, bewegen”, et cetera. I have no authority in interpreting Heidegger, but I feel free to show what I like in his approach: It is his stress on dynamics, timing (zeiten), and, like his follower Gadamer the focus on interaction, dialogue, Gespräch, Weg, Übereinstimmung, correspondance, achieved convergence as shared understanding. (Heidegger gave his “Was ist das- die Philosophie?” lecture to a French audience, hence he occasionally uses French terms like “correspondence” in his talk). To conclude, my argument is that the term “time” is too abstract, at risk of missing the time-generating individuality, of misleading in the form of a discussion which directly starts with trans-individual categories instead of asking about the latter. OK, here we go – now writing and citing in German, since you are a native speaker: xxx Und hier ein weiterer Link zum Thema Ontologie und Mathematik_ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378151159_Mathematics_and_existent… Ein Auszug daraus: General and individual aspects of being To describe individual elements of a system only in terms concerning their trans-individual, general aspects does not work. Yet, the elements’ distinctive individuality can conceptually be introduced by considering a hypostasized individuality- and discreteness-providing potentiality. What emerges from this potentiality, and its individual form are realizations which also have general features, pointing to their “outside” and addressable from this outside in all forms of realized interaction. The supposed individual elements relate to other elements via such shareable, communicable features but they do not exclusively consist of them. Insofar, as description in general terms is a description of the “outside” aspects, which, when realized, are ready to meld with other “outside” aspects, these aspects are embedded in the communication elements, combined with individuality-providing features. They do not govern these further features, but co-act with them in an integral, simultaneously integrity-preserving, and trans-individual-communication-providing form. Objectivity, subjectivity As outlined, describing reality in general terms to then derive the possibility of individuality as subjectivity is not possible. Neither locality nor individuality can be addressed and conceptualized when exclusively using generalities, like those articulated in mathematical description. To approach individuality, a concept is needed which provides an understanding of how trans-individual aspects might relate to the supposed phenomenon of individuality. Here, a bottom-up approach would argue the trans-individual aspects are aspects of individuals which are embedded in them. Next, one needs to create a concept describing how this primordial individuality might be constituted. Again, the appropriate idea comes from the Aristotelian pragmatic differentiation of what has been observed as realized and what must be supposed as the underpinned potential providing chances of trans-momentary coherence, as a preserved individuality. The latter, in turn, if detectable at all must have shareable, addressable aspects to be detectable from its semantic outside. What is detected from the outside is obviously trans-individual, and not a pure inside. This concerns the individual’s features which have the potential to be generalizable. Among these features embedded in the integer potentiality and realized in this potentiality’s acts are those that do not depend on the temporal, spatial, and qualitatively contextual individuality of the observed realization. These features can be depicted in the form of general terms, applicable to what is seen as elements of sets, such as categories. Using a description only in the form of these general aspects hence must be combined with a notice that this description only covers what is beyond individuality, and if the phenomenon of individuality is considered at all, it must be explicitly grounded in a concept of the latter. Liebe Grüße, Thomas